■'■•n<-o« 












^^„ <-'?- 









.-^^ 









•^^-.0^ 






'>^ 



. ^ 1^ ■ 



^°-^*. 



,"!■ 






<^ 



■^■^ 









.^ 



o ■ o 



o 






o 








•*b 


f* 




.0 


r,' 



'?;v. 






^^0^ 



^*' 



A 



V 









•j^ 



0* *o 



N<^ 



.^' 









^■^^' 












-.0' 



> 



"-..^' 






^-^^^ 



^J> 






• * ^ 



,0' 



.-^^ 



^' 









o 



^^ .^^^ 



';<. A 



-J^- 






r V. 






,0^ 



^5 * , . « * V ♦■ 



>0' 









e » o 

> V 



r .... ■'^^. 



'^<^,. 



: ^'-^ ^.l^^i:*;: «>'% 



qV O » 5 

- '■^- 



i7o 









.j5^-:^ 



c. 



4 o . ^ , -r 






o V 



♦ 1^ 






' -^. V^^..^ ^^ - 



> 



•^<J^. 



•e*^^ 









r ^ 









^^ c-u V^i^^^/ ^0 






t^^o^ 



v>^ 



'*'.. 






\^ .4;^^' .'>^^ ""^ 



^oV 



^ v.:te:^^.;;, ^ 



■\ 



<• 



'^. ''%'vv;v v^. ' ^ [>^ 






r-. o^ 



7??^, ■ 



^ .■6. «, •-.<?..§>.• -f 



;'vv''i^'*^ 



^.^-n^ 



-*- '-■'i-'ijCx 









^' 



THE 



SECOND BATTLE 



OF 



BULL RUN, 



AS CONNECTED WITH THE 



FITZ-JOHN PORTER CASE. 



A Papek read before the Society of Ex-Army and Navy 
Officers of Cincinnati, Febrlary 28, 1882, 



BY 



JACOB D. COX, 

Late Mnj. Gf>i. Coiiiitianding z^d Army Corps. 






Wm 



CINCINN Al^^^V' np vi/A5Hl<^^ 
PETER G. THOMJ? ^ ^ 

18S2. 






Copyriglit, 1882, 

by 

Peter G. Thomson. 



F.I.KCTROTYPUD AT 

FKANKLIN TYPE KOUNURY, 

CIN'CINNATI. 



PREFACE. 



In the following paper my aim has been to bring together 
the evidence bearing on a few decisive points. Whoever 
settles these solidly in his mind will find a trustworthy clue 
to the intricacies of the great mass of testimony in the three 
bulky volumes which make up the Congressional docuiments 
relating to the case. To comment upon all the varying state- 
ments of witnesses, and formally weigh all the discrepancies, 
would itself require a volume. For those who may have the 
leisure for it, it would be interesting; but the judgment will 
turn, at last, upon the way one looks at the few central 
points. The question is whether an officer did iiis duty in a 
given situation. To answer it, we have to know what his 
orders were, and whether he obeyed them. If he did not, 
w6 have to inqtyre what means he took to discover the con- 
dition of affairs on the field, and what zeal and energy he 
showed in efforts to do this and to carry out his instructions. 
His conduct must be judged in the light of what he knew, 
and the spirit he showed. 

Facts which he did not know, and took no proper military 
means to discover, can not favorably affect the character of 
his conduct. The conclusion reached, however, is that the 
more of the facts we know, the worse the conduct appears. 
It will be l)etter for the dignity of the country that a former 
judgment of a court should not be reversed on grounds that 

will not bear the ultimate test of historical scrutiny. To 

(iii) 



IV PREFACE. 

help form a right judgment now, is the motive for consenting 
to the publication of a paper, the preparation of which is 
sufficiently explained in its opening paragraphs. 

In the appendix will be found the substance of most of the 
evidence which has been distinctly referred to in the text, 
buth documentary and oral. It is but a small part of the 
whole, but it will enable those who have not access to the 
complete report, to see the character and logical connection 
of facts which must be wholly ignored or overborne before 
one can reach the conclusions which General Porter asks us 
to accept. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



I. Introductory , 

II. March from Warrentou Junction . 

III. Discrepancies in Testimony . 

IV. Time of Longstreet's arrival . 
V. Schenck's and Reynolds' movements 

VI. Errors in Recollection 
VII. Longstreet's position on the field 
VIII. Map of the Battlefield . 

IX. Porter's conduct .... 
X. The Half-past-four order . 
XI. Porter's dispatches .... 
XII. Appendix 

1. Porter's letters to Burnside . 

2. Pope's orders to Porter . 

3. Porter's dispatches to McDowell 

4. Dispatches of other officers 

5. Official reports, National officers, 

6. Official reports, Confederate officers 

7. Oral testimony . . • • 

8. General Garfield's opinion in 1880 
XIII. Index 



1 

8 

14 
15 
20 
28 
30 
31 
"50 
62 
04 

73 
76 
79 
81 
85 
86 
93 
119 
121 



(■■i) 



COISTTEI^TS. 



paok 

Table op Authorities and Abrreviations, , . xL 

List op Maps, xiii 

CHAPTER I. 
The Situation in July, 1862, 1 

CHAPTER II. 
The Battle op Cedar Mountain, ^^\^ 

CHAPTER III. 
On the Rappahannock, 49^' " 

CHAPTER IV, , 

Jackson's Raid, .... .... ^A^ 

CHAPTER V. 
The Pursuit op Jackson, 9^ ^<^ 

CHAPTER VI. ^ ^ 

The Battle of Gainesville, |Jr^ i '^ 

CHAPTER VII. ^ ^ 

McDowell and Porter, 12?) ^"-'^ 

CHAPTER VIII. 
The Battle op Groveton IdC lt)'V- 

CHAPTER IX. 
Longstreet and Porter, ...... j^ "5~ 



X CON'TENTS. 

CHAPTER X. 
TiiK Batti-k t>F Manassas, 



PAGE 



CHAPTER XI. 
Thk Battlk ok Ciiantilly, 2^ 

CHAPTER XII. 

HaI.I,K( K AND McCl.KM-AN, jji>7 '^' 

/ CHAPTER XIII. . , 

' iPlNAIi Rkpi.kctions ggS • 

APPENDIX A. 
Thk Addkkss to thk Army, and Gknkkai- Oudrrs, . ITJi 

APPENDIX B. 
Poktkk's Night MAR(;ir, 178 

APPENDIX C. 
Poktkk's Orders and Despatches on the 39th, . . 181 

APPENDIX D. 
Thk Losses in Battle, 190 

APPENDIX E. 
The Numbers op thk Two Armies, .... 193 

APPENDIX F. 
Time op thk Arrival op Kemper's Division, . , 200 

APPENDIX G. 
Roster op the Federal and Confederate Armies at 
the Battle op Manassas, otherwise called the 
Second Battle op Bull Run, fought on Satur- 
day, August 30, 1862, 204 

INDKX . 217 



THE 

SECOND BATTLE OE BULL RUN. 



Gentlemen of the Society. — Although my 
judgment concerning the case of General Fitz- 
John Porter was sharply defined, and my belief was 
strong that the so-called newly discovered evidence 
in itself tended rather to confirm the judgment of 
the Court-martial which condemned him, than to 
make any good ground for the reversal of the sen- 
tence and the bestowal of honors and emoluments, 
which was recommended by the recent Board of 
Investigation, I still was unwilling to take part in 
the public discussion of the matter. My reasons 
were chiefly personal ones, based on old friendships 
and associations, and would have controlled me but 
for the circumstances which made public my letter 
on the subject to General Garfield, without my con- 
sent. 

The letter was written in February, 1880, when 
General Garfield had no expectation of being made 



2 THE SECOND BA'ITI.E 

a candidate for the Presidency, but was preparing 
himself to defend, in the House of Representatives, 
the judgment of the Court-martial of which he was 
a member. Not long afterward he had casually 
allowed a common acquaintance of himself and Gen- 
eral Porter to read the letter, and Porter thus be- 
came acquainted with an outline of its contents. 
(3n the 24th of May, of the same year, General 
Porter wrote to me, tellinj.:; me of his partial knowl- 
edge of the letter, and asking for a copy of it, that 
he might give me proofs of the errors into which I 
had fallen, and enable me to correct them. 

Naturally surprised at this, I demurred to what 
seemed to be opening the door to a controversy 
with one in his unhappy situation. On referring 
the request to General Garfield, he consented to 
my acceding to General Porter's wish, and I did 
so. Meanwhile, the Convention at Chicago met, 
and the wonderful series of events, beginning with 
Garfield's nomination and election, and ending with 
his murder, followed. I mention the dates given 
above, that it may be clearly seen that the corre- 
spondence, Porter's request for a copy, and Gar- 
field's consent, had nothing whatever to do with the 
Presidential canvass, with which, I have been told, 
there has been some attempt to associate Garfield's 
attitude to the case. 

Somewhat later I learned that copies of mj' let- 



OK BULL RUN. 3 

ter were in the hands of members of the Board ; that 
General Porter liad printed a reply to it ; and that 
whether I would or no, I was driven from the atti- 
tude of private criticism into one of public debate. 
Happily, the friendships which had made me wish 
to avoid discussion were too well-founded to be 
affected by differences of opinion. When, there- 
fore, I learned that this Society desired to have a 
somewhat fuller presentation of my views, I no 
longer saw any good reason for hesitating to speak 
on the subject. 

In December, 1862, a Court-martial tried Gen- 
eral Porter upon charges and specifications duly 
preferred, on which he was arraigned for criminal 
insubordination and disobedience of orders upon 
the battle-field. The Court consisted of Generals 
Hunter, Hitchcock, King, Prentiss, Ricketts, Casey, 
N. B. Buford, Slough and Garfield. Under their 
finding and sentence, approved by President Lin- 
coln, he was cashiered and disqualified from holding- 
office under the Government. 

It was natural that General Porter should devote 
his life to obtaining a rex'ersal of the sentence. As 
soon as the war was over he began corresponding 
with officers of the Confederate army, aiming espe- 
cially at procuring opinions from them that Lee had 
succeeded in concentrating his army on the 2gth of 
August, 1862, before Porter had been able to get 



4 THE SECOND BATTLE 

into co-operation or connection with the rest of our 
army under Pope, who was attacking Jackson on 
the heif^hts above Groveton, in the battle known as 
the Second Bull Run. During General Grant's two ; 
terms of Presidency the newly-discovered evidence 
was submitted to him, but he declined to allow any 
steps to be taken looking toward a re-opening of 
the case. 

In 1878, President Hayes yielded to Porter's so- 
licitations and appointed an Advisory Board, con- 
sisting of Generals Schofield, Terry and Getty, to 
examine the case, in view of the newly-discovered 
evidence claimed by Porter, and to report recom- 
mendations to the President. The anomalous char- 
'acter of such a Board, its legality, and its power to 
compel attendance of witnesses, are questions upon 
which I do not propose to touch. I shall confine 
myself wholly to matters in which you as a Society 
of military men of large experience in actual war 
will be interested. The Advisory Board found that 
Porter's conduct, so far from being blameworthy, 
was a model of military excellence, and advised that 
he be reinstated in the regular army with such rank 
as he would have reached in ordinary course if he 
had survived the war, with pay and emoluments for 
the score of years during which he had been re- 
manded to civil life. The President referred the 
whole subject to Congress. A bill has been intro- 



OF BULL RUN. 5 

duced this winter to carry out in substance the rec- 
ommendation of the Advisory Board. The death of 
President Garfield gives opportunity for renewing 
the pressure for action upon his successor, and this 
is being vigorously used. 

This outline of the situation, condensed as it is 
to the smallest compass, shows that the case is one 
on which the opinion of the men who themselves 
served in the war ought to be felt, and no one can 
question the right of associations like this to lead 
their fellow-citizens in the effort to reach a right 
judgment upon it. 

My own convictions I will state as follows : 

1. The so-called newly-discovered evidence gives 
us nothing worthy to overthrow or to modify the 
judgment of the Court-martial, which tried Porter 
in 1862. Rightly considered, it sustains and sup- 
ports that judgment in a strong and striking man- 
ner. 

2. Lapse of time has greatly increased the unreli- 
ability of mere memory, especially as to hours of the 
day; and as Porter's case rests largely upon this sort 
of memory, the Court-martial convened in the very 
year of his alleged misconduct was much more 
likely to have trustworthy evidence than the Ad- 
visory Board. 

3. The new evidence is almost wholl}' from Con- 
federate sources ; and that part of it which is orig- 



O TllK SECOND 15.\TTI.E 

inal and was contemporaneous with the events, is 
overwhelming!)- in sui:)[)ort of the condition of facts 
found by the Court-martial. 

4. The question of Porter's guilt turned upon his 
conduct under the orders he received, and in view 
of the situation at the time as he and his com- 
mander knew or had the means of knowing it. 
From this point of view, also, the Court-martial 
was right and the Advisory Board was wrong. 

5. To accept the present statements from memo- 
ry of the C'onfederate officers as to the time and 
place of Longstreet's arrival on that field, still 
leaves the most inextricable confusion and contra- 
diction among them, with a decided balance in 
favor of those who agree with the conclusions 
drawn from the general concurrence of witnesses 
who were in the National army, and whose testi- 
mony supports the judgment of the Court-martial. 

6. If Porter were right as to time and place of 
Longstreet on the field, the judgment of the Court- 
martial against him would still be sound on mili- 
tary principles. 

To discuss the w'hole campaign of August, 1862, 
is plainly impossible within the limits of a single 
paper. To discuss the whole series of engagements 
in the last days of that month would carry me be- 
yond the limits of a single evening. I shall have 
to confine mxself to the events u\-)On which the 



OF BULL KU^■. 7 

Court-martial of 1862 based their judi^ment, namely, 
those occurring on the 28th and 29th of the month, 
and on these I must assume that you are familiar 
with the general history. 

The Advisory Board found that Porter's alliums 
towards General Pope, his commander, was of no 
real importance in the case. I confess nn-self un- 
able to comprehend how this was possible. The 
spirit and intention constitutes the difference be- 
tween a man's foolishly being captured by the en- 
em}' and his being a deserter deserving death. It 
constitutes the essential difference between an of- 
ficer's doing some blundering or timid thing, de- 
serving only censure or contempt, and his being 
guilty of the highest of military crimes. The stern i 
law of war punishes even cowardice with death ' 
when it sets a dangerous example; but if a hostile 
i' spirit of hatred and insubordination toward the 
I commander produces the same results as cowardice 
j would, the crime is exaggerated. In the one case 
it may be a physical weakness, which we pity and 
despise, while we punish it ; in the other it is a 
purposed and willful wrong, allied closely to treach- 
ery. To say that malice makes no difference in of- 
fenses, is simply to invert all rules. I must say, 
therefore, at the start, that if any one holds that 
Porter's aiiinius toward his superior officer ought 
not to weisfh in considering- his conduct under his 



b THE SECOND BATTLE 

orders, from him I must part company at tlie very 
beginninjr; for I hold most explicill}- that express 
ill-will and insubordination being once proven, it 
must necessarily affect our interpretation of conduct 
in every situation of the da}'. 

MARCH FROM WARREXTON JUNCTION, AUGUST 2'/-'8. 

The manner in which one judges of Porter's de- 
lay in obeying the order to march from Warrenton 
Junction to Bristow on the night of the 27-28th of 
August will, to some extent, determine his stand- 
point in judging of things which occurred later. 

The order from Pope to Porter was an explicit 
one: "The Major-General commanding directs that 
you start at i o'clock to-night and come forward 
with your whole corps . . . so as to be 

here by day-light to-morrow morning." It said 
Hooker had been in a severe engagement. It indi- 
cated an adwmtage over the enemy, but not a rout. 
It repeated; "It is necessary on all accounts that 
you should be here by daylight." The general 
facts were that the most enterprising officer of the 
Confederate army, with nearly half of Lee's infantry 
and all his cavalry, was upon the line of our com- 
munications. It was a time when extraordinary 
speed of movement and rapidity of combination was 
plainly demanded on our side ; a time when, if ever, 
a commanding officer needed to feel his troops 



OF BULL RUN. 9 

answering like a spirited charger to the spur; a 
crisis in which a supreme exertion may rightly be 
demanded of every officer and man composing an 
army. It was a summer night, the roads were 
dry; and, so far as physical comfort went, the 
troops could march easier than by day ; but no 
matter for that, the order indicated fighting for the 
next day, and was peremptory as to time of starting. ; 
Porter did not obey it, but began his march at 
daylight, the time when he was ordered to arrive at 
Bristow, His excuse was that the night was dark, that 
one of 'his divisions had had a hard march that 
day, and that from such reports as he had, the 
road to Bristow was a good deal obstructed by wag- 
ons. The sufficiency of the excuse can not be 
admitted. It might do for a peaceful march, away 
from the presence of the enemy ; but in war and in 
such a crisis in war, our judgment must refuse to 
assent to the justification. Let us see how other 
soldiers judged of their duty in similar circumstan- 
ces. In Georgia, on the 25th of May, 1864, the 
Twenty-third Corps was marching late in the even- 
ing, trying to reach Pumpkin-vine Creek, after 
crossing the Etowah River. Hooker was in advance, 
and his trains in this case also filled the road. The 
column was necessarily broken, the men picking 
their way among the wagons, straggling out by 
the road-side when it was possible to march there, 



lO THK SKCONl) 15ATTLK 

and being wearied .ind u orried to the last degree 
b)- the obstacles. Just before dark distant firing 
was heard. Schofield ordered that the column 
should close up and push on as fast as possible. 
A severe thunder-storm came up, followed by 
pouring, drenching rain, in which the corps contin- 
ued to march till midnight, and then went into 
bivouac by the road-side, not a wagon or tent of 
their own being near them. Instead of seeking 
.shelter. General Schofield himself pushed forward 
to see what had been going on ; and in trv'ing to 
pass some wagons his horse fell with him into a 
gully which could not be seen in the darkness, and 
he was severely hurt. But orders were sent for the 
corps to continue its march, after only a single hour 
of rest they marched again, and the gray in the 
east was just appearing when they reported to 
Sherman and asked for an assignment of their posi- 
tion on the field. Hooker had had, as in 1862, a 
very severe action, though it was at New Hope 
Church this time. There was no council of di- 
vision officers called to consider the propriety of 
marching, but orders were issued and the march 
was made, and every soldier knows that it is only 
in that way that campaigns are made successful. 

It is a telling sarcasm on Porter's conduct that he 
was, at Warrenton Junction that very day, writing 
to Burnside that no vigor was shown by Pope's 



OF BULL RUN. 1 I 

command; that the enemy was "pursuing his 
route iinuwlcstcd to the Shenandoah;" that he found 
"a vast difference between these troops (the Army 
of Virginia) and ours;" and that they "needed 
some good troops to give them heart, and, I think, 
head ! " 

Wliatever good services Porter had done before, 
gave to his new commander the right to expect 
abihty and efficiency from him ; and when we see 
him, day after day, sneering at Pope, and, as in 
the letter quoted above, basing his sneers at Pope's 
ignorance of the situation upon an ignorance of 
his own, more glaring in contrast with the facts as 
history now reveals them to us, than anything to be 
found in Pope's dispatches, we find ourselves con- 
cluding that General T. C. H. Smith was, on the 
whole, right in interpreting Porter's animus as he 
did, and in saying that Pope might expect him to fail 
him. It is only just to judge what occurred on the 
29th of August in the light of this conduct and of 
this spirit. 

No doubt military orders are to be taken accord- 
ing to the spirit rather than the letter, and that a 
certain discretion belongs to a corps or division 
commander ; but the danger is that this discretion 
will be made the pretext for doing less than he is 
ordered to do. It would be safer to say that dis- 
cretion is left the subordinate to do more, but 



12 THE SECOND BATTLE 

rarely to do less than ordered, if the thing is pos- 
sible. A commanding; officer will be forced to put 
his orders in curt and peremptory phrase always, 
if his subordinates arc to find reasons in his expla- 
nation for doing- as much or as little as they please. 
I There may be good reasons why a dispatch shall 
conceal the true reasons for an order. It is rarely 
wise to say any thing which could do harm if it fell 
into the enemy's hands, and any dispatch may do 
so. In the presence of an enemy a subordinate 
is never justifiable in drawing reasons from the nar- 
rative part of a dispatch for neglecting the manda- 
tory part. He is bound to assume that his supe- 
rior had good reasons for his order, and knew as 
well as he who receives it, that there may be appa- 
rent inconsistency between the thing commanded 
and the situation as partly described. Pope's reit- 
erated and emphatic assertion of the Jiecessity of 
Porter's presence by daylight meant, and could only 
mean, that the advantage Hooker was said to have 
was still consistent with so;ne imminent danger, or 
some imperative necessit)' in regard to proposed 
action. We can not ignore or forget that ever)'' 
body knew the situation was a very grave one. 
Porter's own dispatches show that he knew the 
rest of Lee's army was forcing the marching to 
join Jackson, and that a series of engagements had 
already begun which must end in the disgrace, if 



OF 15ULL RUN. 1 3 

not ruin of the National army, unless every corps 
and division commander exhibited the fullest ener- 
gy of which he was capable. And the delay of 
Wednesday night does not stand alone. It was 
followed by the order to march at first blush of 
dawn on the 29th, receipted for at half-past five 
but not obeyed till seven. The interval was used 
on that morning, not in writing a dispatch to Pope 
saying that the order was received after the con- 
templated hour of movement, but he would try to 
make up for the delay by instantaneous marching 
and increase of speed, — no, instead of this Porter is 
writing at six a long letter to Burnside, repeating*' 
his sneers at Pope's assumed ignorance of the situ- 
ation, talking of his taking two corps to Centerville 
as a "body guard,'" when the dispatch in his hand 
showed that Pope had not moved with these corps 
to Centerville at all, but was at Bull Run. He 
says to his correspondent: " Comment is unneces- 
sary," when that phrase is to be used, if at all, by 
those who consider his conduct under such circum- 
stances. He exhibits himself plainly as a disaffect- 
ed subordinate, writing professional libels on his 
superior, while he neglected and delayed obedience 
in so systematic a way as to demonstrate that his 
commander was likely to fail in any combination 
which depended on his promptness or efficiency. 



14 'i"HK Sl'XOM) BA1TI.L-: 

I )ISCRK FANCIES IX TESTIMONY. 

In considcriiiL;- testimony' of the kinds presented 
to us in this record we sliould kee[) in mind the fact 
that much of it is the remembrance of men after 
sixteen y^ears has ekipsed. No one will claim that 
this is as reliable as contem[)oraneous evidence. It 
would be a miracle if much were not lost, much 
misremembered after that lapse of time. In re- 
calling events so remote, a natural law of memory 
will give length of duration relatively great to those 
occurrences in a given day which seem most im- 
portant. 

Again, judgment as to the hour of day, is, after 
a long interval, one of the most uncertain of things, 
unless there is something like the peculiar light of 
dawn, of twilight, of gathering darkness, etc., asso- 
ciated in the memory with the picture itself, and so 
helping to fix the time. Dispatches noting the 
hour of sending, or indorsed with the hour of re- 
ceipt, are among the most reliable fixed points 
from which we can reckon, and should outweigh 
other evidence as to time, when such dispatches 
seem to be sent in the ordinary course of business, 
and are free from sus[)icion of being made for a 
purpose. 

Men mean to perjure themselves much less fre- 
quentl}- than people think, and palpable inaccura- 



OF BULL RUN. I 5 

cies in testimony on immaterial po ints, are^ quite 
consistent witli the general truth of a statcment'*>>^ 
We have swift witnesses who really think the}' re- 
member every thing the counsel who calls them 
may insinuate, and we have others who are easily 
led into the trap of testifying to immaterial details 
on which the)'^ have no clear memory. The case 
before us illustrates both these phases of inaccuracy. 
The orderlies who accompanied Captain Douglass 
Pope in carrying the 4:30 order were readily led 
to say they remembered a steeple on Bethlehem 
Church, a thing easily accounted for by the firm 
association of a steeple with a church in the minds 
of most Northern men. Porter's counsel argued 
that here was proof of false swearing, but they do 
not seem to have noticed that, of the two witnesses 
called to contradict the orderlies, and who tell us 
they had known the church all their li\'es, one 
testifies that the church was a frame building, and 
the other that it was built of brick.* 

So, also, Porter called a number of vcr}' respect- 
able witnesses, including General Morell, to dis- 
credit the cavalry officer commanding the detach- 
ment which accompanied the troops in the move- 

*The volumes and passes referred to in the foot-notes are tliose 
of the Congressional ]jiil)Iication of the proceedings. (Vol. 3, p. 
1 1 16. 



l6 THE SECOND BATTLE 

nient to Dawkins Branch, and who, in substance, 
deny that any such caxahy detachment was pres- 
ent. Yet, in the very opening statement of coun- 
sel was read a dispatch from Porter to Morell that 
day, asking to have some of ' ' that cavalry " sent 
back to him at Bethlehem Church.* 

Of the swift witness kind is the staff officer who 
insisted that he carried reports direct from Colonel 
Marshall on the skirmisn line to Porter frequently 
during the afternoon of the 29th, and that Porter 
was nearly all the time at the immediate front, 
when nothing is better settled than that soon after 
McDowell left. Porter went back to Bethlehem 
Church on the forks of the Sudley road and stayed 
there till evening, f 

We have to discriminate as to the value of testi- 
mony under all such circumstances, but it is not 
necessary to assume willful lying on the part of wit- 
nesses. After so long a time, memory and imagina- 
tion get easily mixed, and this is no small objection 
to opening so old a case. 

THE QUESTION OF THE- TIME OF LONGSTREETS AP- 
PEARANCE ON THE 29TH. 

In view of the difficulties which surround the 
case, it is very desirable to fix some conclusive and 
satisfactory starting point in determining the very 



» Vol. 3, p. 33. tVol. 2, p. 416. 



OF DULL RUN. 1 7 

importarit questions of time on the 29th. It would 
seem that it may best be found in the arrival of 
Heintzelman's corps on the field and in the move- 
ment of Poe's brigade around Jackson's left flank. 
The very fact that this was the opposite extreme 
of the field from Porter, and that the hours are 
fixed without reference to him, makes the testi- 
mony disinterested as well as trustworthy. 

Heintzelman came on the field about ten in the 
morning, and tells what was then going on, includ- 
ing the movement of Kearney's division in which 
was Poe's brigade. This is fixed by the entry made 
at the very hour in Heintzelman's diary, and is 
accepted by every body. Poe is thus shown to be 
right in his statement of the time of his effort to 
outflank Jackson's left. He deployed between the 
Matthews house and the Sudley road after ten 
o'clock and moved forward, crossing Bull Run, and 
so far succeeded in his purpose as to create con- 
fusion and dismay for a time in Jackson's i'ear. This 
can not have been earlier than half-past ten, con- 
sidering the character of the movement, and Porter's 
counsel recognize this fcict by dating Poe's position 
near Sudley Church on the map accompanying their 
argument, at eleven o'clock. Here, then, we have 
a fixed point about which there is no dispute. Let 
us hold fast to it.* 



«Vnl. 2, p. 5S0. 
2 



1 8 THE SECOND BATTLE 

General J. K. B. Stuart, in the memorandum at- 
tached to his report, says he was there when this 
attack was made ; that he gave the directions for 
some of his artillery and troops to resist it ; names 
the officers of both arms, one of whom was mor- 
tally wounded ; states the time as about ten, and 
tells us that after the flurry was over he started to 
find Longstreet. * Mark that this was contempo- 
raneous evidence, both Heintzelman's diary and 
I Stuart's report, and made without the remotest 
' reference to Porter. It is corroborated b)- wit- 
nesses from both the Confederate and the Na- 
tional armies in the most abundant way, but it does 
not need corroboration. If wc know any thing 
about that field, we know that Stuart started from 
the scene of Poe's attack to find Longstrect, not 
earlier than half-past ten o'clock, and probably as 
late as eleven. He took with him a considerable 
body of ca\'alry, Robertson's brigade at least, and 
rode by way of Catharpin Valley around Jackson's 
rear, thence across the country to Gainesville, and 
out toward Thoroughfare Gap, meeting the head of 
I Longstreet's column between Gainesville and Hay- 
market. Adopting, therefore, the time fixed by 
Porter and his counsel as that of Poe's affair on our 
extreme right (eleven o'clock), taking also into ac- 

»Vol. 2, p. 359. 



OF 15L'LL RUN. I9 

count the ordinary rate at which a large body of 
liorse would move in marching, as Stuart marched, 
and looking to the distance they had to go, it is 
quite within bounds to say it took Stuart an hour 
and a half to get to the point named ; and that, 
therefore, the head of Longstreet's column was half- 
wa\- between Ha\-market and Gainesville at half- 
past tweh'c, certain!}' not earlier than noon. They 
were then two hours' ordinary march from Jack- 
son's right at the Douglass house, and it would take 
forced marching to reach there in an hour and a 
half It would seem pro\-en, therefore, that they 
could not, and did not, make connection with Jack- 
son before half-past one. The simple chain of evi- 
dence which leads to this conclusion seems decisive, 
and it best harmonizes a host of other ficts. It is 
also most in accord with the best contemporaneous 
evidence of other sorts on both sides. 

Remember that Lee had no cavalry but what 
was with Jackson, that Longstreet had Ricketts' 
division in front of him, opposing his advance dur- 
ing the evening before, and had no reason to sup- 
pose his road was clear in the morning ; that he 
must have skirmished — nay, that he did skirmish 
carefully forward, as Hood's report shows; and that 
Cadmus Wilcox, who came by the other gap, says, 
in his official report, that he reached the junction of 
the roads liU'st of Haymarket at half-past nine, and 



20 THE SECOND BATTLE 

found Long-Street's column just passing there.* 
This in itself makes absurd the Buford dispatch on 
which so much has been built by Porter, and 
destroys it, except as evidence that Buford wrote 
it at half-past nine upon mistaken information. f 
Whilst Hood says that he himself got on the field 
earlier, he J^uts the time when the whole of Long- 
street's column arrived at two o'clock. X These 
and many other collateral things go to establish the 
fact as above stated, but it is time to hasten to the 
next step, which is to see how far the independent 
line of proof taken from the movements of Schenck 
and Reynolds forces us to the same conclusion. 

schenck's and Reynolds' movements on the 
morning of the 29th. 

What has been said above sufficiently indicates 
that Longstreet went forward cautiously, and there- 
fore slowly, till he met Stuart ; then, getting the 
latest news, and learning of Jackson's necessity, he 
hastened the marching, while Stuart, with a de- 
tachment of the cavalry, galloped, as Blackford 
says, to the place near Hampton Cole's, on the 
Monroe Hill, where Rosser, with one regiment of 



"Vol, 2, 535; vol. I, p. 472. 

tN, B. Buford, vvlio was on the Court-martial, was half-brother 
of him who sent the dispatch. It can not be said that it was not 
likely to have all due weight given to it. 

t Vol. I, p. 552. 



OF BULL RUN. 21 

cavalry, was keeping Porter from advancing by his 
demonstrations, and by the dust which his troopers 
raised by dragging the brush in the road.* 

Let us now look at the center of the field. It is 
clear that though Sigel's forces were moving earlier, 
the slow character of Schenck's advance, as he 
describes it, made it about noon when he swung for- 
ward from the woods bordering Lewis Lane, No. I. 
Benjamin's testimony is conclusive on this point. 
He commanded a battery of regulars, and belonged 
to the Ninth Corps, which came on the ground 
about noon, as appears from Heintzelman's diary, 
and he was ordered to report to Schenck, to assist 
in his movement then in progress. He identifies 
the ridge just east of Groveton where his battery 
went into position, his right on the pike. He men- 
tions the enemy's skirmishers in front of and to the 
west of him, which were driven out. He says he 
placed his battery about half-past twelve, that after 
a few shots all was quiet for an hour, then a severe 
artillery fire was opened from the direction of the 
Douglass house, and the cannonade lasted till late 
in the afternoon, when he had to withdraw his bat- 
tery to repair damages and reorganize, f This covers 
the whole period of Schenck's movement, and his 



-Vol. 2, pp. 673, 678; voL 3, p. 1073. 
tVol. 2, p. 608. 



22 THE SECOND BATTLE 

return to the road cast of Lewis Lane, where he 
covered the position of the battery and remained, 
as he testifies, till four o'clock or later. Schenck 
is not only corroborated by General McLean, Major 
Fox and others, but a decisi\e fact is found in their 
going through the well identified wood where Gib- 
bon's field hospital was after the fight of the night 
before, and where Schenck had those still living 
cared for and sent to the rear. No more intelligent 
or unimpeachable witnesses could be found than 
those who thus testify. Schenck, every body knows. 
McLean is a son of the late Judge McLean, of the 
United States Supreme Court ; Major Fox is a well 
known businessman of high standing in Cincinnati; 
and Colonel Benjamin, now Assistant Adjutant Gen- 
eral at Washington, served both in the East and 
in the West, and was well known as one of the 
coolest and bravest officers of artillery in the army. 
But Reynolds' division was on Schenck's left and 
went forward also. General Meade commanded one 
of his brigades. Reynolds was Porter's friend, had 
served in his command before Richmond, and both 
he and Meade were men who could not be charged 
with making careless or false reports of their part in 
the engagement. Reynolds reports that he crossed 
the pike, pushing forward to turn Jackson's right, 
and continued the movement till Longstreet came 
on the field, and artillery opened upon him in rear 



OF liL'I.I. RUN. 23 

of his left flank. "^ Meade told McLean in person that 
he had got into a hornet's nest of batteries. Other 
testimony shows that they retired only because they 
were too late to accomplish their purpose. 

If we let Schenck occupy the Gibbon woods and 
extend Meade on that flank, with the rest of Rey- 
nolds' division beyond him, even if somewhat re- 
fused, it is plain that they must have occupied the 
high ground at and beyond the Cundliffe house. 
Reynolds hhnself says he had partial possession of 
the highest ground south of the pike when the Con- 
federate battery was put in, viz., the Monroe or 
Stuart Hill, near the pike.f He subsequently saw 
what Schenck's report said of his retiring, and in 
his correspondence with Colonel Cheesbrough, of 
Schenck's staff, as well as in his own testimony, he 
distinctly says that Longstreet's troops were not 
deployed across the pike till one o'clock or some- 
time in the afternoon. He corrects Cheesbrough 
by asserting that it was not till /atr in the aftern.oon, 
towards dusk, that Longstreet's deployment was so 
complete as to outflank him on the left, after this ^ 
wing had been drawn back.:|: He says his artillery, 
supported by Meade, engaged Jackson on the same 



■•■Vol. 2, p. 506. 
tV(.l. I, p. 167. 
J Vol. I, pp. 166, 167; \'ol. 2, |). 507. 



24 THE SECOND BATTLE 

ridge they were on, till his position was made un- 
tenable by the approach of Longstreet on the pike. 

As to the time of Longstreet's arrival, therefore, 
this independent mode of determining it corrobo- 
rates the former. The testimony of Benjamin es- 
tablishes the fact that the re-enforcements in artil- 
lery, which went into jjosition on Jackson's right, 
and which, as we know from Longstreet, were his 
batteries, came into action between one and two 
o'clock, and were added to for some time later. 
Reynolds plainly insists that he did not begin to 
withdraw till after these re-enforcements arrived ; his 
subordinates, together with Schenck, McLean and 
their subordinates, confirm this view. 

It is the connection of these things with definite 
and fixed starting points that gives them their force, 
and when we find that Reynolds and Schenck, with- 
out knowledge of where Stuart was or what he was 
doing, give us the same conclusion as to the time 
of Longstreet's arrival, that we deduce fi'om Pete's 
affair on the right and Stuart's subsequent ride to- 
ward Haymarket, and when an independent esti- 
mate reached from a still different starting point in 
Benjamin's case, brings us to the same result, no 
amount of subsequent guessing at the time can 
change it. Now add the time it would take to de- 
ploy and put in position the whole of Longstreet's 
command after the head of the column came up, 



OF BULL RUN. 25 

and it could not have been earlier than three, it was 
quite likely to be as late as four, when his right 
reached the Manassas and Gainesville road on which 
Porter was. 

It will be seen, by and by, that Porter gave no 
new cause for anxiety to Lee later in the afternoon, 
and Longstreet, being informed as he came up, of 
his being on their flank, sent Wilcox's division 
across, as soon as his connection with Jackson was 
safely made and he was assured that Reynolds had 
really given up his aggressive movement. But both 
Lee and Longstreet put this late in the day, and j/ 
Wilcox's report and testimony say it was half -past i'^ 
foiir.'^ This may fairly be said to fix the time when 
he had finished his deployment, and was at liberty 
to attend to other matters. It is not credible that 
he should not have sent Wilcox earlier if he had 
been in position before noon. 

The fact that Rosser's cavalry dragged limbs of 
trees in the road to create the impression upon Por- 
ter that a large force was in front of him, neither 
has been nor can be contradicted. It has only been 
waved aside as of little consequence. It can not be 
properly treated so. Rosser says that he did it for 
several hours, and that it was done to deceive Por- 
ter. Stuart says in his official report that Porter's 

* Vol. 2, p. 535. 



26 THE SECOND DATTLE 

own report proved the success of the ruse. Chap- 
lain Landstreet watched it with interest because 
lie knew its purpose. The fact beini^ undisputed, 
it is impossible to Ljet away from its loL^ical conse- 
cpiences. The ruse was practiced because Long- 
street was not )X't in position, and it was presuma- 
bly continued until, and only imtil, the need of it 
was over, and the Confederate line was formed. It 
is one of those speaking facts which outweigh a 
world of those estimates of time from mere mem- 
ory, for which General Gibbon sensibly testified that 
"he would not give a snap of his finger." It is not 
necessary to treat Rosser's estimate of three or four 
hours differently from other estimates. Take it 
simply that he continued it for so long a time that 
the best impression he now has is as he gives it, 
and it still seems a capital, if not a decisive fact in 
the case. If the time were only half what he thinks, 
it still shows that for some two hours after Rosser 
became aware of the presence of Porter's column, 
there was nothing but a little cavalry to pre\ent the 
latter from pushing over the hill at Hampton Cole's 
and Monroe's, and into close support of the mov^e- 
ment Reynolds and Schenck were making. 

Closely connected with this, and almost conclu- 
sive in itself, is the testimony of Major White of 
Stuart's staff. When Stuart reached the hill in 
front of Porter and saw what was going on, he sent 



OF BULL RUN. 2/ 

White to Jackson to report the Union troops corn- 
in"- on that road. If Longstreet had been between 
Stuart and Jackson, would White have been sent 
clear across Longstreet's front to the latter? Long- 
street, therefore, had not yet arrived when Porter 
came to Dawkins branch, no matter what you call 
the hour, and Jackson on the hills north of the pike 
was the nearest Confederate commander to whom 
to send. But White, on his return from Jackson, 
took a short cut through the wood where Gibbon's 
dead and wounded lay. This shows that Schenck's 
advance had not yet reached there, or would make 
it so late as to show that Longstreet was some 
hours later in arriving than even General Pope has 
claimed. The circumstances show that it was be- 
fore Schenck's movement, for White saw the artil- 
lery firing from Cole's toward Reynolds on that 
officer's advance over the same ground the witness 
had traveled in coming back from Jackson. But I 
do not intend to repeat here what has been pre- 
sented in another form as a summary of evidence at 
this end of the line, but only to point out how 
solidly it supports that which is drawn in turn from 
our right, our center, and from the best reliable and 
fixed data given by Confederate witnesses. 



28 THE SECOND BATTLE 

ERRORS IN' RECOLLECTION. 

At as early a day as 1866, General Porter began 
to collect from Confederate officers such letters as 
would fav^or his application for a reversal of his sen- 
tence. In October, 1867, he got from General R. 
E. Lee, a letter based on memory, which is one of 
the most convincing proofs of the unreliability of 
such recollection.* In it Lce puts the time of the 
arrival of Longstreet's head of column on the field 
as early as Cadmus Wilcox's official report proves 
it to have been at the Junction of the roads between 
Thoroughfare Gap and Haymarket, and an hour and 
I a half earlier than Poe's attack on Jackson's left, 
which occurred before Stuart started on his seven- 
mile ride to meet Lee himself, with Longstreet, be- 
tween Gainesville and Haymarket ! Lee's estimate 
of about two and a half hours as the time it took 
Longstreet to get into position after the head of the 
column came up, is x'aluable as based on an ex- 
pert's knowledge of the time such maneuvers would 
ordinarily take, and is totally different from the 
attempt to recollect a particular hour of the day. 
With such letters as this of Lee's, and some similar 
ones, it would be strange indeed if Porter and his 
counsel could not make other officers and men on 

* Vol. I. p. 551. 



OF BULL RUN. 2g 

both sides modify their opinions. An example of 
this is found in Longstreet's admitted modification 
of former statements after talking with Porter's 
friends in attendance upon this investigation. Men 
naturally hesitate to put their recollection against 
that of others whom they respect, when the state- 
ments of these are pressed upon them. But fortu- 
nately for history there are facts and conjunctions 
of facts makin"; logical chains to which 7;u7v mem- 
or}' is as a rope of sand. We may assume that the 
time of the occurrences that morning of the 29th 
has been shoved forward at least a couple of hours 
in the minds of nearly all the Confederate officers 
by the knowledge that those letters had been writ- 
ten, except where their own official reports or mem- 
oranda made at the time have saved them from 
doubting their own judgment. White, of Stuart's 
staff, seems to be one of the clearest and most con- 
sistent witnesses of the whole class, yet he, who 
was with Stuart at the time, under the influence of 
this epidemic of refreshed recollection as to hours, 
puts the affair with Poe near Sudley at eight or 
nine in the morning, though Stuart's report at the 
time said about ten, and Porter and his counsel now 
admit it was eleven, as has been shown. This error 
in starting must run, of course, through the middle 
of the day, at least, and until some new departure 
occurs to set it rieht. Such considerations as these 



30 TllK SECOND liAlTir: 

give great, strength to General Gibbon's estimate of 
the small value of memory as to the mere time of 
day in the midst of such exciting scenes, unless the 
recollection is helped by the fixed data to which 
reference has been made. It is therefore not merely 
because the concurrent evidence from several inde- 
pendent sources proves the arriwal of Longstreet to 
have been much later than the time when Porter 
reached Dawkins branch, but also because that fact, 
is not so dependent upon what is thus indicated as 
the most untrustwortlu' kind of evidence, that it 
should be regarded as overweighing the honest but 
most fallacious efforts to fix the time by recollection 
alone after so many years. 

LONG.STKF.in's POSITION ON 'I'HK FIELD. 

If Longstreet was not in position in front of Por- 
ter for four or five hours, or one or two hours e\"en, 
after the latter reached Dawkins branch, his de- 
fense of his conduct fails. But the student of the 
field will desire to determine for himself what Long- 
street's position on it was. There are difficulties in 
the way of a satisfactory conclusion, but the weight 
of evidence is largely in favor of putting him west 
of Page-land Lane. 

Let us go back and study the topograph)' of the 
field a little, which we may do. as to the greater 
part of it, b\' the aid of Cieneral Warren's map 



OF DULL RUN 



with contour lines of elevations, which is number 
six of the quarto vohune accompanying the Board's 
report. 




BATTLE FIELD 

Second 

BULL KUN. 

SCALE OF MILES 
'i ?2 ^i 



Porter's command was in the only considerable 
forest that was in the whole field of operations that 
day. Had he been out of it anywhere, he could 
hardly have failed to see what was going on. The 



32 THE -SECOND CATTLE 

country was undulating, the ridges being fifty or 
sixty feet only above the hollows in which the in- 
significant water-courses ran. The topographical 
lines nowhere show any deep ravines, nor any con- 
formation which would prevent movements of an 
army in line of battle except in the wood already 
spoken of; and as to that, General Warren testified 
to what every military man could tell a priori, that 
there would be no difficulty in taking troops through 
it if the outskirts were held. It constituted, there- 
fore, simj)!)' an obstruction in the way of maneu- 
ver, but had the advantage also of being a cover 
for the movement of Porter's troops as soon as the 
terrain was understood by the officer in command. 
In Porter's immediate front, fiom the ridge on 
which Morell's troops were deployed to the Hamp- 
ton Cole house, near which the Confederate cav- 
alry officer put in a section of a light battery, is a 
distance of something more than a mile and a-half 
by the scale, with a hollow of only sixty feet be- 
tween. The ground was open in the direct line 
west from the creek, but wooded to the left and 
along the dirt road, so as to afford excellent cover 
for skirmishers advancing. At the Cole house, 
which both the contour lines and the testimony 
show to be one of the most important points on the 
field, there is a convergence of roads. That by 
which Porter was advancing, the Manassas Gap 



OF BULL RUN. 33 

Railway, the old Warrentoii and Washington road 
by which McDowell's left would naturally have 
gone into position, a lane from the Gainesville pike, 
and a road from Bristow Station (General Banks' 
position), all meet at that point. 

From the Monroe house, on the crest a little 
further west, the view reached as far as Gainesville, 
and revealed every thing between there and Pope's 
head-quarters at Buck Hill. Here was Stuart's po- 
sition beyond all doubt, and the elevation bears his 
name in the vicinity to this day. Chaplain Land- 
street was there with him, and though the lack of 
fuller development of this part of the map made 
him refer Stuart's position to the Cole house, his 
testimony is clear and telling as to what he saw. 
The character of this position must be kept care- 
fully in mind. 

Morell's ridge slopes upward toward the east, to 
the crowning point called Mount Pone, a bald knob 
in the open, which is the only considerable ele- 
vation within the Union lines. On the slope behind 
_Morell the contour line marked two hundred and 
ten runs, by a very direct course north, coming 
into the open ground where it crosses the old War- 
renton and Washington road, before mentioned, 
and thence continues in an almost equally direct line 
to the Chinn house, where the slope descends to 
the Gainesville pike, near Pope's head-quarters. By 



34 llli- SKCOND BATTLE 

a direct line, therefore, and on an exact level, going 
neither up hill nor down c\en so much as five feet, 
the position of Porter's advance division was 
connected with the position occupied by Sigel's 
corps that morning, the screen of woods alone pre- 
venting this from being [)lain to their eyes at the 
time. 

But, again, the old Warrenton and Washington 
Road, leaving the Hampton Cole house, goes east- 
ward along a ridge on almost exactly the same 
contour last mentioned, being a practically level 
road till it meets the prolongation of Morell's line 
of deployment extended northward. Near this 
point the road marked Compton's Lane goes off to 
Groveton, descending the slope and passing through 
the position in which Reynolds' division was that 
morning on the left of Schenck. Around the foot 
of the gentle slopes to the north runs Young's 
Branch, in the hollow which separated the posi- 
tion of the United States troops from those of Jack- 
son, who lay on the still more commanding ground 
to the north, on a ridge forty or fifty feet higher 
than that which connected Schcnck's with Porter's 
position. 

The official maps made by General Warren, ex- 
cellent as they are in other respects, are deficient 
in not extending the contours which mark the to- 
pography, so as to include the Monroe or Stuart 



OF BULL RUN. 35 

Hill, which is the crest of the high ground, of which 
Hampton Cole's is a part. The Judge Advocate 
presented one in argument, which indicated the 
topography further west toward Gainesville, but it 
was not before the witnesses when they testified, 
and was so ridiculed by Porter's counsel that one 
might well hesitate to trust to it, if General Porter 
himself, in a paper printed since the investigation, 
had not treated its topography as correct. 

It is to be regretted that the witnesses were not 
referred to a map which showed the character of 
the ground at one of the most important points of 
the field. A witness who has before him what is 
treated as an official chart of the theater of opera- 
tions is almost certainl}' led to place every thing 
within those limits, and this influence is manifiest 
in the testimony of several. In the official map 
this absence of contour lines west of Hampton 
Cole's gives to that point the appearance of being 
the crest from which Gainesville was visible. Wit- 
nesses would naturally be led to speak of that as 
the crest, which, in fact, was a little farther west, 
at Monroe's. This, however, makes no material 
difference in the conclusion to be drawn from the 
testimony, as may easily be made apparent. 

Let us extend our examination of the field over 
the portion not contoured by General Warren. The 
natural starting point is at the Douglass house 



36 THE SliCONL) BATTLE 

-near the right of Jackson's hne, and which is a 
prominent feature in all descriptions of the engage- 
ment. That house stands on the slope running 
from the contour line marked 220 feet to that 
marked 240 feet. Going south-westerly along the 
general line of the ridge which formed Jackson's 
position, we find ourselves on a continuing hill, of 
which the crest is about five hundred }'ards wide 
between the contours marked 220 on the two sides 
of it. 

This ridge, thus directly continuing Jackson's po- 
sition, crosses the pike and keeps the same direc- 
tion south-west for three-quarters of a mile, till it 
reaches the Manassas Gap Railroad, which is there 
on the top of the watershed dividing the streams 
flowing southward into Broad Run and towards 
Bristow, from those flowing northward into Cathar- 
pin Run (behind Jackson), and into Young's 
Branch. Immediately in rear of the place last 
named, and toward Gainesville, the ground rises 
again above the contour marked 240, and even 260, 
and forms an almost semicircular ridge with its 
two flanks on the pike, and its face southward in 
the direction of Bristow. If the larger ridge last 
described were occupied by a line of battle, no 
military man will fail to see at once the strength 
of this position for a refused flank on his extreme 
right, if there were the slightest reason to appre- 



OF BL'LL RUN. 3/ 

hend the approach of an enemy from any point 
between south and west — from Bristow to the di- 
rection of Warrenton. Tiie position thus described 
is crossed by no ravine or water-course. It has in 
front the hollow in which runs the upper part of 
Young's Branch, which makes an elbow, and crosses 
the pike twice, bearing away to the south-east, 
toward the Lewis-Leachman house. On the north 
side of the pike the continuation of the same con- 
tour level comes forward like a bastion or salient 
in the line till it reaches the edge of the "Gib- 
bon Woods," to which reference has so often been 
made. Nearly the whole front of this position, 
from the pike southward, is covered by a screen of 
woods, the open crest behind being thus admirably 
placed for easiest and most concealed maneuver, 
whilst the open front which stretches southward 
from a point a little west of the Douglass house 
gives the needed sweep for the artillery which was 
placed there. The smaller map used by Porter's 
counsel in argument and numbered i6, shows two 
things more clearly than the larger ones, viz : the 
relation of the branch of Catharpin Run to the 
parallel part of Young's Branch, and the continua- 
tion of the unfinished line of railway till it unites 
with the Manassas Gap Railroad. The latter very 
significanth' indicates to any one having an eye for 
topograph}', that the natural continuation of Jack- 



38 Tin-: SECOND BATTLE. 

son's position was along^ the same line of rail- 
road survey upon the ridge which has just been 
described. 

Such considerations make it almost certain that 
when Lee came on a field where Jackson was al- 
ready warmly pressed b)- a force which the com- 
manding General believed to be equal or superior 
to his own, he would form his right wing on this 
plain prolongation of Jackson's formation, unless 
something in the character and position of the 
Monroe Hill should forbid. It is not necessary to 
assume that Lee would mean to sta)' permanently 
where he formed his line of battle. His tactics 
were quite as likely to be aggressive in those days 
as ours. We must remember, too, that Stuart 
already held the highest part of this saddle-shaped 
Monroe Hill, and that it is called by his name in 
the neighborhood now, from the fact that he took 
his station on the southern end of it with his horse- 
men, after he came back from his meeting with 
Lee and Longstreet, on the Haymarket road. The 
middle part of the ridge is no higher than the cor- 
responding part of the one west of Page-land Lane, 
which has been described above. The northern 
part, which runs up to the contour line 240, is 
narrow; its length is north and south, and both 
sides of it arc completely enfiladed by the batteries, 
which, it is admitted, were massed in tlu' interx'al 



OF BILL RUN. 39 

between Jackson and Longstreet and near the 
Douglass house. These were Meade's "hornets' 
nest."' That sahent would have proved as useful to 
the Confederate artillery if an attack by the left 
center of our forces had been made on Longstreet's 
right after he was fairly in position, as it proved 
the next day when the artillery was massed upon 
Porter in his attack at our right center. Lee could, 
therefore, perfectly well afford to neglect occupy- 
ing the Monroe Hill till he was fully assured that 
there was no danger impending on his extreme 
right and rear. It is toward that direction we 
must turn our thoughts for a moment to appreciate 
his conduct. 

Lee had left Pope in his old front on the Rap- 
pahannock when he started to follow Jackson in 
the bold movement on the rear of the National 
army. He knew, also, that the Army of the Po- 
tomac was on its way to Join Pope. As Jackson 
had the cavahy with him, Lee had to act on faith 
and not on sight till he reopened communications 
with his subordinate at or after the passing of 
Thoroughfare Gap. All that either he or Jackson 
knew or could know was that the United States 
army was concentrating; but he was necessarily 
ignorant of the extent to which this had been ef- 
fected. Is it not certain, therefore, that the line 
of railroad from Warrenton to Manas.sas must have 



40 Till-: SKCOND BATTLE 

represented to him the general hne of the army 
under Pope, whilst the doubtful point to be settled 
was whether it had concentrated ? Lee's anxiety 
on this subject is shown by the promptness with 
which he pushed some cavalry toward Warrenton 
to find out u hether Pope still had forces there, and 
his doubts were not solved till the night of the 29th, 
when he got his report.* During the day of that 
date he was therefore necessarily influenced in his 
movements and in choosing his position, b}' the 
contingency of attack from the west as well as soutli. 
This \'iew of the case so palpably occupied hi« 
mind and his subordinates' tha*: by a sort of com- 
mon consent they speak of Porter's column as com- 
ing from the direction of Bristow, which was the 
direction of shortest approach from the general 
line of Pope's army, as has been shown. The)' 
even allowed this natural theory of the situation to 
outweigh the fact that those of Porter's troops 
which they saw were on the Manassas road. Bas- 
ing our judgment, therefore, on the most solid and 
fundamental facts in the general problem, we must 
conclude that it would be the natural and the wise 
thing for Lee to do in his situation, to extend Jack- 
son's line on the continuous ridge, keeping the 
still higher crround commandin<j the Gainesville 



* Vol. 2, p. 545. Report of Maj. Ilaiislon. 



OF BULL RUN. 4I 

pike and the Bristow road as the strong point to 
be occupied in force, if a serious push at him were 
made either from Warrenton or from Bristow. It 
is clear, also, that this high ground was that which 
Early had occupied in the morning, before the ar- 
rival of Longstreet, to cover Jackson's flank from 
apprehended dangers of precisely the same sort. 

With this view of the situation, with the certainty 
that Ricketts had withdrawn toward Bristow, with 
the presumption that King's division had done the 
same, with the probability that Banks and the rest 
of Pope's arm\' would be in the same direction (as 
was the fact), with the knowledge that one of the 
corps of the Army of the Potomac had come on the 
field from Centerville (Heintzelman's) as Jackson 
must have learned from his prisoners, Lee must 
almost necessarily have concluded that he was to 
have Pope's Army qf Virginia on his front and right, 
and the Army of the Potomac on his left. On true 
military theor)', therefore, Lee's line would be 
where it is placed above. If he had made a crochet 
at Jackson's right and put Longstreet on the line 
reaching thence to Hampton Cole's, his right wing 
would have been "in the air," sticking out like a 
sore thumb in a position to be most easily hurt. 
When he had settled the fact that his right and 
right front were not threatened, or that his forces 
were greatly superior in number or in morale to 



42 THE SECOND BA'ITLE 

Pope's, he could afford to advance that wini; for 
decisive attack, as he did next day, but he would 
be quite unlikely to do it at once upon his arrival 
on the field. We must consider the testimon\' in 
the light of these probabilities when we strive to 
reconcile conflicts in the memory or the opinions 
of the witnesses in the case. 
/. Hood tells us in his report that he formed on the 
^ extension of Jackson's line,* leaving a gap for the 
massing of the artillery. Wilcox fixes his own place 
in support of the artillery and behind the ridge. 
Both these positions are properly described only by 
taking the line we have selected. Stuart, as we 
have already seen, occupied the south end of the 
Monroe Hill. Neither he nor any one who was 
with him, says that Longstreet's formation was in 
front of that ridge. On the contrary. White and 
Blackford, his staff officers, Chaplain Landstreet of 
his command, and Colonel Rosser, all locate Long- 
street's line behind Pageland Lane. Citizen Mon- 
roe, who lived on the hill, and was there that day, 
describes the "skirmishers" who were around his 
house (meaning probably Stuart's men), and says 
they were in front toward Hampton Cole's, but he 
places the line of battle of Longstreet behind Page- 
land Lane also, and says that none of these troops 

* Vol. 2, p. 5.:;4. 



OF BULL RUN. 43 

went forward to the east of his house till the mid- 
dle of the afternoon, when Hunton's brigade did 
so. * Hunton was a resident of that vicinity, and 
is the recent member of Congress from that dis- 
trict. The naming of his brigade by Monroe is 
therefore doubly important, because it was one in 
which were his neighbors, and uhich he would be 
likely to know well. Now we know from Lee's 
and Longstreet's reports that Hunton was ordered 
forward to support Hood in the contest between 
him and McDowell's men on the pike that e\X'ning, 
and this makes Monroe's testimony strongly cor- 
roborative of the rest. Citizen Carraco, whose 
house was nearest of all to Porter's front and a little 
east of Hampton Cole's, was at home all day till 
about four p. M., when, on warning from the Con- 
federate officers, he went to the rear going past 
Cole's and up the railroad toward Gainesville about 
a mile.f He crossed no line of the enemy and 
saw none but a few cavalrymen with a single can- 
non a little in the rear of Cole's. If the Confeder- 
ate line had been where Longstreet and some others, 
guessing at it, drew it on the map, he must neces- 
sarily have crossed it, as he must also have done if 
it had been anywhere on a possible position in 
front of that which has been indicated. All the 

■•■■'Vol. 2. p. 925. tVol. 2. p. Q2I. 



44 I'l'E SECOND BATTLE 

evidence given us by the reports of Reynolds and 
Schenck and the testimony of their subordinates is 
very strong in the same direction ; indeed, it is 
irreconcilable with any other conclusion. The tes- 
timony of Colonel Marshall, who commanded Por- 
ter's skirmish line, is decisive to the same effect, if 
his testimony is worth any thing. He was brought 
forward as a peculiarly trustworthy and important 
witness by General Porter and his counsel on several 
occasions. His testimony was taken in the original 
trial, when he was on what was supposed was his 
death-bed from wounds received in battle. This 
fact was somewhat dramatically brought out to add 
to the solemn weight of his testimony. Stress was 
laid upon the fact that he was a regular officer, 
educated at West Point, and his opinions were put 
forward as if those of an expert. Most of this has 
an unpleasant air of clap-trap, but it certainly shows 
that his testimon)' must be taken as final by those 
who called him, when he speaks of military posi- 
tions which he says he saw with his own eyes. His 
opinion that it was unsafe for Porter to attack under 
the half-past four o'clock order was said to be itself 
enough to exonerate his commander. If his testi- 
mon)' is good as to his fears, it certainly should be 
good as to his facts. He says that at tJircc o'clock in 
the afternoon, or later, the enemy developed an in- 
fantry force, t/ic first infantry Jie had seen in his front. 



OF BUI.r. RUN. 45 

about a mile north-west of the point near the Ran- 
dall's house, (a little south of Hampton Cole's) 
where he himself crawled to make his observation.* 
A simple measurement of a mile north-west from 
the point where he placed himself, puts Longstreet's 
command again beyond Page-land Lane. If this 
force appeared there at three o'clock or later, and 
was the first infantry seen in Porter's front (and 
nobody else even pretends to have seen any), it 
demonstrates that Porter might have occupied 
that hill from Cole's to Monroe's for three or four 
hours at least, and have perfected his connection 
with the rest of the line long before Longstreet 
came dangerously near to him. As Marshall, there- 
fore, from his command on the skirmish line, was 
the man upon whom Porter depended for the facts 
regarding the situation, and whom, as he claims, 
he trusted implicitly, he must be held to have 
known that Longstreet's line of battle was nowhere 
near the Hampton Cole house. 

It agrees also with Longstreet's official report, in 
which he says that "late in the day" he heard of 
the Union troops on his left flank and sent three 
brigades there. All the Confederate witnesses agreej 
that no man of their infantry on Porter's front was' 
engaged that day. With one accord they say it 

* Vol. 2, p. 132. 



46 THE SECOND BATTLE 

was onl)- the cavalr}' \edcttes that had a skirmish, 
and that so shght a one that we hear of no casual- 
ties on either side on the skirmish hne. 

Following Longstreet's line back again toward 
Jackson, we find the Confederate General Wilcox 
testifying that his division was placed 400 yards in 
rear of the artillery which was on the crest between 
Longstreet and Jackson ; and when, after the com- 
bat with McDowell's troops that evening, he was 
withdrawn, he not only says it was to a position 
forming connection between Lee's two wings, but 
that this intervening space was a ridge behind which 
they could be sheltered.* We can find on the map 
nothing which answers to this description except 
the connecting ridge which has been described, and 
on which Longstreet's line has been located. Law, 
of Hood's division, who seems to have borne, on 
the Confederate side, the brunt of the fight on the 
pike that evening, saws that in the night he with- 
drew to the position he occupied in the morning, f 
This corroborates the conclusion drawn from Wil- 
cox's testimon}'. 

In opposition to all this is the opinion of several 
Confederate officers which does not seem to be 
based upon any such decisive identification of lo- 
calities. 

■■"Vol. 2, p. 266. tVoI. 2, p. 542. 



OK HULL RUN. 47 

Their opinion can not be accepted without re- 
jecting that of Reynolds and Schenck and their 
subordinates, upon points where it is quite incredi- 
ble that they should be mistaken. We should have 
to reject, also, the testimony of a greater number 
of Confederate officers, who had better opportuni- 
ties of knowing the exact facts in relation to the 
position of their right, besides the citizens whose 
testimony has been referred to. 

But the assumption of the line at Hampton Cole's 
has difficulties of quite another sort. Jones, whose 
division is supposed to be on the brow of the hill 
immediately facing Porter, makes no reference to 
Porter's existence in his official report. Neither 
does Kemper. The testimony, which comes from 
witnesses who were in their commands, all indicates 
that they were not in Porter's presence at all. Dray- 
ton's brigade was put out at right angles to Jones' 
line, in support of Robertson's cavalry, late in the 
day ; and this circumstance, which is clearly intelli- 
gible if Jones was where we have placed him, would 
be utterly unintelligible on the other hypothesis. 
With Jones at Hampton Cole's, his skirmishers should 
have been in contact with Porter, and he would 
have reported it. He not only does not report it. 
but officers from his command testif\' to the con- 
trary. Yet Porter is supposed to ha\'e paralyzed the 



48 lllE SECOND BATTLE 

action of all these troops, which did not know of 
his existence. 

Longstreet admits frankl}' that he don't know 
where to place Stuart and his cavalry, upon his 
theory of the field. But Stuart ts placed be}-ond 
dispute where he would be behind and surrounded 
b)- the infantry if Longstreet is right, naniel\% on 
the Monroe or Stuart Hill. That is not where he 
was apt to be, and there is no scintilla of evidence 
that he sought such shelter. But Longstreet's 
effort to construct a theor\- favorable to Porter, in- 
volves him in other gra\e inconsistencies. In his 
letter, which Porter drew from him in 1866, he 
refused to state hours, and we have seen that he 
modified his opinions at this latest investigation 
after conference with Porter's friends. He now says 
he arrived with his head of column on the field 
about ten, having been in supporting distance since 
nine.* That is to say, a command stretched out 
three or four miles, as he says his was, is in support- 
ing distance when the head of the column is some 
tliree miles away! Such support as that gave Na- 
poleon many an opportunity to whip an enemy in 
detail. He says he was deployed within an hour 
(though Lee says it would take more than twice 
that time), and within twenty minutes thereafter, or 

«Vol. 2, p. 117. 



OF BULL RUN. 



49 



by twenty minutes past eleven, he made a personal 
reconnoissance to the Lewis-Leachman (more proba- 
bly Cundliffe) house. That on his return, and while 
tellintj Lee what he saw, Stuart's report of Porter's 
advance reached him.* This would be, say half- 
past eleven o'clock. But when he is asked, in a 
subsequent part of the examination, the hour at 
which he got Stuart's report, he says two o'clock in 
the afternoon, t His official report, which says 
" late in the day," and Wilcox's report, which says 
half-past four, only enlarge the discrepanc}' and 
show the confusion of memory into which the con- 
ferences with Porter's friends had led him. 

Again he says:{: that Porter dehuxd them, and 
that if they had had three or four more hours of 
light, they would have attacked. Waiving the fact 
that they actually made an attack at dusk, another 
indisputable fact is that they did not attack all the 
next day till the middle of the afternoon, though 
Porter was clean gone during the night. Still again 
he says§ that he did not know of Porter's with- 
drawal till next morning, when his official report, 
made at the time (and Stuart uses almost the same 
words), says that after a few shots Porter withdrew, 
moving around to Pope's front, and apparently join- 



*Vol. 2, pp. I20 and 129. tPage 124. 

t Page 121. jj Page 1 2 1 . 



50 TIIK SFXON'l) HATTLK 

hv^ in the attack on Jackson,* and when lie shows 
also by both his report and his testimony that .so 
far from Porter's holding" his troops fast, he with- 
drew again Wilcox's division from his right, and 
used him in supporting Hood's attack in the center, 
which, being thus made with Hood's and Wilcox's 
divisions, and part of Kemper's, should be regarded 
as a general attack b}' him, for most of his com- 
mand was thus put in, and the rest were read}" to 
follow it up if he was successful. He admits failure 
of success, because lie sa}'s he withdrew Hood on 
account of finding Pope's troops so heavily massed 
in his front, "i" To such a tissue of inconsistencies 
and contradictions does his benevolent disposition 
to help Porter bring him, and such is the wiluable 
newly-discovered evidence on which the judgment 
of the Court-martial of 1862 is to be rexxrsed. 
From whattn-er direction we approach the subject, 
therefore, we are brought to the same conclusion as 
to the time and place of Longstreet's deplo\'ment. 
The time was at least three or four hours after Por- 
ter reached Dawkins Branch, and the place was 
west of Page-land Lane. 

porter's conduct on the 29TH. 

A written dispatch of General Sykes to General 
Morell, dated half-past eight on the morning of the 

*Vol. 2, p. 526. tlhi'1., p- 521. 



OF BULL RUN. 5 1 

29th, at Manassas Junction, sa)^s that the column 
was delayed while more ammunition was distrib- 
uted. On the principle already stated, this date 
will be taken as a fixed point in that morning's his- 
tory, and as showing that Porter's command was 
then at the Junction. 

As to the delay itself, it appears in the testimony 
that the men then had forty rounds of ammunition 
with them,* and if speed was really meant, the need 
of waiting there to distribute more is at least ques- 
tionable. In the west, the common way would have 
been to put the ammunition wagons into the column, 
and take other opportunities to distribute it, as the 
men's cartridge boxes were already full. We have no 
right to forget that, from the 26th onward, Pope's 
dispatches constantly urged haste. The one under 
which Porter was now acting repeated it. Every 
hour was of incalculable value as the event showed. 
But passing this by, we will assume that by nine 
o'clock Morell was leading off on the Gainesville 
road. The distances by scale seem to be a mile 
and a half to the forks of the Sudle}^ road, where 
Porter's head-quarters were during the afternoon, 
and from there two miles to the ridge east of Daw- 
kins Branch, where Morell deployed. From all 
the testimony as to the actual rate of marching, he 



Vol. 2, pp. 333 and 431. 



52 THE SECOXn 15ATTLE 

ought to have been there in less than an hour and a 
half, and that would not be rapid work. Some of 
the witnesses put the time of arrival at the branch as 
early as ten, but Porter claims that it was about 
eleven, and we may take it so, simply noting the fact 
that this certainly shows no excess of zeal in getting 
forward. The\' had taken a prisoner or two, and had 
seen a citizen, and learned that some of the enemy's 
cavalry, a small number, were between them and 
Gainesville. Skirmishers are thrown out and ex- 
change a few harmless shots with Rosser's videttes. 
What ought Porter then to do? 

To get rid of some fog, we must look at Mc- 
Dowell's relation to the command. The famous 
"joint order" had directed him to follow Porter, 
and whilst they acted together, ^McDowell would. 
by virtue of seniority, have the right to command 
both corps, but this would be true only while the)' 
acted together and were beyond the immediate 
orders of the General-in-chief McDowell did not 
issue any orders to Porter up to the time he was 
with him in person at Dawkins Branch. He was 
looking after King's division, which was in rather 
bad plight after its combat of the evening before, 
and the night retreat. The "joint order," and Pope's 
special order to Porter were so far in accord that 
the latter was simply carr\-ing out these directions, 
and was certainly bound to do so, in their full pur- 



OI' BULL RUN. 53 

pose and spirit, unless McDowell exercised his rii;ht 
to conmiand by stopping;" him or niodifyin<;" the 
order. Thus far no such thini;' had been done, and 
in speed of i^'oin^ foi-ward, vi^or of attacking- any 
thiny; he should meet, and strivint;" to do all that the 
order called for, he was as fully responsible till inter- 
fered with as if McDowell had not been th .-re at all. 
lie should, no doubt, have advised McDowell if he 
found an)' great force before hini, but it can not be 
questionable that his business was to get into posi- 
tion alongside of his comrades, whose cannonade he 
heard in the direction of (iroxeton, and whose shells 
he and his troops saw bursting in the air when they 
came in front of the bit of open ground at Dawkins 
Branch. Hie indisputable fict that he never brushed 
awa\- the cavalrv skirmishers in his front, neva-r de- 
veloped any infantry of the enemy, and has to-day 
to rely upon conjecture antl purelx' circumstantial 
evidence to prove that there was an)- infantry force 
immedi.-'tely before him till late in the day, prove 
that he showed no vigor or energy whatever. 

It seems to have been a full hour before McDowell 
came to Dawkins Branch in person, and there is no 
evidence of an)' dispatch or message from Porter to 
him. He seems to have found that Porter's column 
was halted, and then to have ridden forward to dis- 
coN'cr the cause. As it tuined out, it is greatl)' to 
be reuretted that McDowell did not remain and 



54 'il'E SECOND BATTLE 

assume practical and efficient control of the move- 
ment on that line, but it is easy to understand how, 
in view of the difficulty of bringing up and deploy- 
ing the whole force in the woods, he should have 
concluded that the " quickest way to appl}- his force 
to the enemy," was to go forward by the Sudley 
road whose forks were close to the head of his own 
column, and bring his men into line on Reynolds' 
left, where from his theory of the situation ac- 
cording to his map, he would probably be within 
easy communicating distance of Porter. He may 
have erred in judgment, but he did not retire to his 
tent. He acted, " he marched to the sound of the 
cannon," as the Comte de Paris says, and went as 
directly as possible toward his object, till he com- 
municated with, and got new orders from his com- 
manding General. 

Had Porter "kept things moving," supporting 
his skirmishers properly, he would have been be 
yond the Hampton Cole house before McDowell 
came to the front, and the latter, in view of what 
he must have seen in fi\'e minutes' gallop on the 
Warrenton and Alexandria road around and east 
of Carraco's, could never have dreamed of any cir- 
cuitous march to reach the field. It is the fatalit}- 
of war that one blunder or fault involves many 
more. Porter was mentally and morally prepared 
to find the enemy before him, and from the moment 



OF BULL RUN. 55 

his skirmishers exchanged shots with Rosser, he 
stopped stock-still, and never dreamed of another 
step in advance. By the time McDowell came up 
Rosser had set his wits to work, and the dust was 
rising from the brush his horsemen were dragging 
along the roads. Hearing Porter's report and see- 
ing the dust, McDowell reached the conclusion that 
he could bring his men into action most speedily 
by way of the Sudley road, and hurried off for that 
purpose. 

The testimony is not conclusive as to what were 
McDowclfs parting orders to Porter, but the bur- 
den of proof is upon the latter to prove that they 
were explicit, that they contained directions he was 
bound to obey, and that they controlled his judg- 
ment in fact. McDowell testifies that he expected 
Porter to put his men into action there, but no sol- 
dier needs to be told that not even an explicit order 
from McDowell could continue to control Porter 
after the union of their forces, on which alone Por- 
ter's subordination was based, had been broken. 
Left to himself, his first duty as a soldier was to find 
out what was in front of him, and to do with energy 
what there was to do. A vigorous reconnoissance 
in force by a single brigade would have told the 
whole story in less than half an hour. Instead of 
this, even his skirmish line did not press the enemy, 
two or three cannon shots were exchanged, Porter 



56 THE SECOND BATTLE 

went two miles to the rear, to his tent, and the quiet 
was only disturbed by the cannonade off to their 
right, where Jackson was wishing more earnestly for 
night or Longstreet than Wellington did for "night 
or Blucher.' 

Longstreet tells us that within twenty minutes 
from the time his line was formed he was down at 
the very verge of his skirmish line, making his own 
reconnoissance of the force in his front ; but neither 
Porter, nor any division or brigade commander of 
his is found showing any curiosity in that direction. 
Is this what is to be expected of an energetic and 
faithful commander? We should grievously wrong 
the members of the Board if we should assume 
that they practiced upon the example which they 
officially declare is a model of all that is soldierly. 
It is a pleasure to note the different rules of duty 
they applied to themselves when important things 
were dependent on their action. When Schofield's 
little army was retreating from Columbia, Tennessee, 
the night before the bloody battle of Franklin, at 
the close of November, 1864, one of his subordi- 
nates, coming to Spring Hill with his command at 
midnight, sought the General to get further orders. 
Stanley ^)ld him that Schofield had taken the ad- 
vanced guard and gone off to Thoinpson's Station 
to settle for himself the truth of the report that 
Forrest was alrcad)' intercepting us at the forks of 



OF BULL RUN. 



57 



the road. This was not in the middle of a summer 
day, but in the middle of a raw autumnal night. 
He, at least, was practicing upon the maxim laid 
down by the Archduke Charles, in his principles 
of strategy, that the commander who wants to give 
energy to his troops must live with the advanced 
guard. 

But as to Porter on that day, nothing can be 
made plainer than that from the moment he found 
one of Rosser's videttes in front of him he gave up 
every thought of advancing and settled down into 
absolute inaction. The officers on the skirmish line 
tell us they found comfort in the understanding that 
they w'ere "not to bring on an engagement."* 
General Sturgis, who reported w^th a brigade just 
before Porter left the front, was sent back at once 
to Manassas Junction. f Very soon Sykes' division 
is found stretched back to Bethlehem Church, and 
a little later even beyond the forks of the Sudley 
road, so that General Tower, himself a regular, 
recognized the regular troops on the right-hand side 
of the road as he marched in Ricketts' division, 
past them to the field. ;{: Morell's men began soon 
to follow in the same direction as General Griffin 
and others tell us,§ till long before dark the whole 



■•■• Vol. 2, pp. 660-661. t Vol. 2, p. 689. 

JVol. 2, p. 452. iiVol. I. ]). 158. 



58 THE SECOND BATTLE 

command, except the skinnishers and one brigade, 
was strung along the rt)ad, expecting momentarily 
the sip^nal to march to Manassas, and Porter had 
written his dispatch to McDowell, saying, in sub- 
stance, that as he was satisfied that Pope had been 
beaten, whilst he himself was thus lying idle with- 
in earshot, he had determined to withdraw . 

Porter's counsel wasted a deal of ingenuit}' in 
trying to show that he had ordered an advance of 
some sort before he got the half-past four order. 
To what end ? Is there the slightest indication that 
any new conjuncture had arisen, or that any new 
facts had come to Porter's knowledge to make him 
push at five, when he had lain stock-still since 
eleven ? If his military conscience had by that time 
become uneasy, it only proves that he knew he 
ought to have acted long before. 

On the Union side, in the morning, the central 
line was the old Warrenton Ridge road, and the 
plain!)' indicated strategic movement for our army 
was to swing forward a strong left flank, interposing 
it between Jackson and Longstreet, if {)ossible, be- 
fore the junction of their forces, the movement be- 
ing made simultaneously b\- the whole line, and 
with as much ciiscuiblc as j^ossible. If Longstreet 
had not arrived, the line of battle would have been 
parallel to the general Confederate line, and a chance 
in a ranged battle could have been accepted or de- 



OF BULL RUN. 59 

clined, according to circumstances. Therefore, if 
Porter had been at the north edge of the woods in- 
stead of being in them when the forward move of 
the morning was made, it is seen at once that he 
could have gone forward on the left of Reynolds. 
Now, where would that have taken him ? Let us 
see. The testimony proves beyond cavil that 
Schenck occupied the woods south of the pike, 
marked on Warren's map between the words "War- 
renton " and "Gainesville" in capitals. Re}'nolds 
was on his left, and these two divisions were swing- 
ing the left forward to get toward the right flank 
of Jackson. Had Porter been on their flank there 
would have been four Union divisions nearly on a 
line from the woods just spoken of, where Schenck 
found the dead and wounded, toward the Monroe 
or Hampton Cole house. That such a line would 
more than fill the space is proved by the fact that 
Longstreet filled zvhai Porter clavns is the same 
line, with only two divisions, viz : Kemper's and 
Jones'. 

If, therefore, Porter's movement had been coin- 
cident in time with Schenck's and Reynolds', he 
would have come into line whenever he reached the 
Hampton Cole house in his front, and if, by promptly 
pressing forward when he came to Dawkins Branch, 
this would have resulted, we need not care (as I 
have said in another place) whether it was ' ' by 



6o THE SECOND BATTLE 

good luck or good management," he could, in fact, 
have been in his proper place on the field. 

We have seen that in Lee's o])inion, as an ex- 
pert, it took Longstreet about two and a half hours 
to get into position after the head of his column 
reached the field, and it is, no doubt, a f;iir estimate. 
]kit Porter needed only to have the head of his 
column on the Stuart hill to have had the whole 
field under his eye. From the Hampton Cole house 
he could have seen for himself where Schenck and 
Reynolds were, he would ha\'e had straight com- 
munication by the Warrenton and Alexandria road 
along the ridge to Pope's head-quarters, and could 
have solved by actual vision every question of to- 
pography as well as of tactics. To have held that 
point even for ten minutes would have shown to him 
how to retire, if he must retire, by a concentric 
movement, which would have kept him in position 
relatively to the rest of the arm)', for the ridge road 
would have been his own. Even if Longstreet's 
wing had already been there, a temporary posses- 
sion of such a point on so important a field was 
worth a severe struggle. With the information and 
the orders he already had, and the knowledge of the 
situation he already possessed, with the noise of 
his comrades' battle in his ears, and with the con- 
viction which he was too intelligent to lack, that 
from the bare hill before him he would see what 



OF BULL RUN. 6l 

the forest around Morell alone was hiding, it is too 
plain for serious argument that he ought to have 
pushed for that hill-top. When we add to this 
what we have seen of the actual movement of Rey- 
nolds and Schenck, whilst he was Uing there, and 
the fact that neither in time nor in place was Long- 
street near him, our judgment must go with the 
Court-martial of 1863, that what he did was a mili- 
tary crime. 

When we are told of the newly-discovered evi- 
dence, found chiefly in the charitable disposition of 
Confederate officers to speak kindly of the " bridge 
that carried them safe over," and to remember 
things as favorably as possible, and when we are 
asked in reliance on this to falsif)- the reports of 
nearly every National officer on the field, from 
Meade on the left to Poe on the extreme right, it 
is well to recall the fact that among this newly-dis- 
covered evidence is this, that the total force of our 
army on that field was superior to Lee's combined 
army by just about the amount of Porter's corps. 
The latest historian of that campaign, himself 
friendly to Porter, gives the number of Heintzel- 
man's, Reno's and McDowell's corps at 53,000 men. 
Lee's he puts at 54,000, including cavalry.* 

The rest were engaged in deadly contest with the 



* Ropes' Army under Pope, pp. 194-199. 



62 THE SKCOM) liATTLE 

cncm\'. The orders of (ieiieral Pope were aimed 
at thnisting" this surpkis streiii^th with a teUiiig- blow 
upon the flank of his opponent, or, if }'ou please, 
upon the extreme right of his line, and we are told 
it was not safe to do it. In behalf of the soldiery 
of the Ameriean army we may insist that the thing 
lacking to make it only that danger out of which 
courage "plucks the flower safety" was the proper 
leadership for this flanking force ; this it was which 
needed, in the language which Porter had written to 
Burnside, something " to give it heart if not head." 
The truth is that its leader lacked heart. 

THE H.\LF-PAST FOUR ORDER. 

At half-past four, Pope, impatient at hearing noth- 
ing of Porter, sent his peremptory order to attack 
at once. The time when this reached Porter has 
been sharply contested, and a strong and direct 
attack was made upon the veracity of Captain 
Douglas Pope, who carried it. To brand this officer 
as a perjurer has not seemed too great a ]irice to 
pay for Porter's reinstatement. A careful attention 
to the evidence shows that this attack is entirely 
undeserved and is cruelly unjust. 

In Warren's written dispatch to S\'kes, dated at 
5:45 p. M., we have one of those reliable dates, like 
that of Sykes to Morell in the morning, which must 
outweicrh all mere efforts of memorv. Mark that 



OF BULL RUN. 63 

Griffin's brigade of Morcll's division was then a 
mile and a half or two miles from the front,''' which 
would bring them very near Porter's head-quarters. 
Warren's brigade of S>"kes' division was just east 
of them. Randol, of the regular artillery, was so 
close to Porter's head-quarters that he saw Captain 
Pope arrive, and was soon told that he had ' ' got 
to go to the front again."! The order went to 
Morell, he sent back to Griffin, Griffin made his 
column about face, Warren did the like, and after 
tliat, he wrote his dispatch to Sykes, with the hour 
noted above. That all this took half an hour needs 
no telling, and the testimony proves, be)'ond rea- 
sonable cavil, that it was done in consequence of 
the order Captain Pope had brought. That order 
reached Porter, therefore, a very few minutes in- 
deed after five o'clock. Amid all the wild guessing 
as to hours, which makes it almost ridiculous to 
rely on what anybod)' in that command remembers 
as to time on that day, this dispatch of Warren gives 
us sure and solid ground of the sort I have tried to 
make the criterion in the various parts of that day's 
history. Captain Pope received the order at half- 
past four, tells us it took him from half to three- 
quarters of an hour to carry it to Porter. This im- 
pregnable array of facts shows that it was delivered 

* Vol. I, p. 158. t Vol. 2, 11. 146. 



64 THE SECOND BATTLE 

as he said it was. There can Ijc no satisfaction to 
any true soldier in the picture of Porter's com- 
mand that afternoon, and all must wish, for the 
sake of the common reputation of American arms, 
that there had been a gleam of energy some- 
where in those weary hours. The order to go to the 
front ag-ain was hardly issued before it was recalled ; 
it was too late for Porter to do any thing, but Wil- 
cox, who had been sent to Longstreet's flank in the 
expectation that Porter might do something, was 
on his way back to join in the fierce assault it was 
not too late for the Confederates to make upon 
McDowell's men at Groveton on the pike. 

PORTERS DISPATCHES. 

If, however, lack of energy were all the fault we 
had to find with Porter's conduct, it would be com- 
paratively easy to pardon it. It is the reading of 
his dispatches to McDowell and King which makes 
it hardest to reconcile his actions with a spirit of 
honest service to his commander. First of all, we 
are not permitted to overlook the fact that it was 
his duty to communicate directly and fully with the 
Gencral-in-chief on the field. From the time Mc- 
Dowell marched up the Sudley road. Porter was 
acting under Pope's orders alone, under no obliga- 
tion to communicate at all with McDowell unless 
they came into such neighborhood on the field that 



OF BULL RUN. 05 

information might be exchanged for the good of 
tlie common canse. The "joint order" had no 
longer any effect, whatever might have been its orig- 
inal intent. Almost immediately after McDowell 
left, Porter went back nearly to the forks of the 
Sudley road, between there and Bethlehem 
Church, and his tents were pitched between the 
roads. We are not permitted to forget that this 
was the direct road from Pope's own position or 
head-quarters on the field to Manassas Junction, 
and that as McDo\\"ell had expected to lea\-e thcit 
road and move into position somewhere on a pro- 
longation of Morell's line, it would be more direct 
to communicate with Pope than with McDowell, 
even if there were no imperative duty to do so. It 
will not do to say he did not know where Pope 
was. He had staff-officers and orderlies to find 
him. He did not know where McDowell was, and 
his staff-officers and orderlies had to find him, and 
found him, in fact, with General Pope. In the dis- 
patch sent in the morning early, Pope had said he 
was following the enemy down the Warrenton turn- 
pike. In the joint order he had said his head-quar- 
ters would be with Heintzelman or at Centerville, 
Porter's imperative duty was to communicate with 
his commander, by seeking him first with Heintzel- 
man 's corps, which A\-as fighting near this Sudley 
road, north of the Warrenton pike, and we know 



66 THE SECOND BATTLE 

that in sending there, his messenger would have 
passed Pope's head-quarters on the way. He did 
nothing of the kind. From dayhght till dark no 
single message is shown to have been sent from him 
to his commander on the field. 

Men who have served in the war do not need to 
be told that it was not the wont of General of- 
ficers to report to another subordinate when they 
could avoid it. Interchange of news or counsel, 
and requests for assistaiice and cooperation were 
common, but any man who has seen serxicc will 
smile at the idea of Porter's thinking he was under 
McDowell's command after they had separated, 
when Pope had never ordered him to report to 
McDowell, and the only pretended subordination is 
based upon tne provisions of the arm)' regulations 
whilst both remained together and both were de- 
tached from the main arm\-. McDowell went to 
join that main arm\-, and, of course. Porter knew 
he was then answerable to the General-in-chief 
Porter's dispatches to McDowell, in no sense differ 
from those exchanged between officers who are in- 
dependent of each other, but who wish to cooper- 
ate. He tells what he means to do, without asking 
whether McDowell approves or not : does not inti- 
mate that he was looking to McDowell for orders ; 
does not imply that he is not also fully in commu- 
nication with Pope, as it was his primar\- dut\' to be. 



OF BULL RUN. 6/ 

]^ut the reading of the contents of those dispatch- 
es is our most painful task in the hght of these facts, 
and of his actual personal situation close to the 
]\hinassas and Sudle}- roatl. He sa)s he "failed in 
getting Morell over to him." This implies an ex- 
pectation on McDowell's part that this could be 
done, and a feeling on his own part of the necessity 
of explanation. The truth, as the evidence shows 
it. is that McDowell's back was hardlj- turned be- 
fore he stopped Morell, the latter having encoun- 
tered no obstacle worth naming. Not only did he 
not try to get Morell over, but what we now know 
of the field shows that there was no difficulty in 
deling so if he had chosen. Men who have marched 
through the Wilderness, through the thickets of 
Northern Georgia where the compass vvas their 
constant guide, or through the Salkehatchie swamps, 
making their dozen or fifteen miles of corduroy 
road a day, can feel nothing but contempt for the 
talk of obstacles between Porter and Groveton, 
where his men could have marched b}- the flank and 
his artillery have moved easily behind them on the 
Five-forks road along that dry and level ridge. 
From the Manassas Gap Railway on which Mc- 
Dowell and Porter rode, to the head of Compton 
lane, in the open ground on the other side of the 
woods, is barely a mile by the scale. But besides 
all this, the statement was baseless in fact. Gen- 



68 THE SECOND BATTLE 

eral Morell testified that no effort whatever, great 
or small, was made after McDowell left. 

"After wandering about in the woods for awhile 
I withdrew him," the dispatch goes on to say. 
This means an effort on a large scale — the wander- 
ing of a division over a region where there was 
room for a division to wander. The plain truth is 
that the division could not have been all deployed 
to the right without having that flank where it 
could see out of the woods on the other side, 
and the simple deployment of the corps could not 
have been made without being partly in the fields 
over which Reynolds moved. Take the distance 
from Morell's position on the Gainesville road to 
Porter's own head-quarters near the Sudley road, 
and over which the command remained stretched 
during that afternoon, and measure with it from 
Morell northward, and see where it will bring you. 

"My scouts could not get through," "my mes- 
sengers have run into the enemy" — what astound- 
ing- assertions are these ! The road from his own 
head-quarters by which McDowell had marched to 
join Pope is known to have been absolutel}^ free 
from any approach of the enemy, and had been 
occupied by our troops most, if not all of the day. 
King's division had passed over it just after noon, 
and Ricketts' division was marching over it whilst 
he was writinf{ these words. Parties had been using 



OF BULL RUN. . 6q 

it carrying rations and ammunition from Manassas to 
the troops at the front. Porter's dispatches to 
Morell bear internal evidence of containing infor- 
mation which he got from some of these parties as 
they passed. What then can be meant by messen- 
gers running into theenem)-? As for scouts, there 
is no evidence that one was sent out in any direc- 
tion. Two artillery officers, seeking water for their 
horses, rode out through the bushes towards Five- 
forks and were fired upon by some one whom they 
did not see, and who was probably a straggler from 
Reynolds' command, who took them for an enemy. 
There is positively nothing else in the testimony 
on which these statements can be based. Stuart's 
officers, Longstreet, and all of our own who were 
north of the ridge road, unite in testifying that not 
ex-en a Confederate skirmish line came east of the 
Hampton Cole house till late in the day, and it is 
ridiculous, with the map before us and anybody's 
marking of the lines, to say there was any thing to 
prevent a regiment or a squad from going to the 
north edge of that woods during any half-hour from 
eleven a. m. of the 2Qth till the next mornine- 

But these dispatches could convey to those who 
might receive them but one impression, and by 
every rule of interpretation their author must be 
held to have meant it. They implied that Porter 
was at Morell 's front, earnestly endeavoring to ad- 



70 THE SKCOXI? BA'ITLE 

vancc, and tr^-iiiL]^ hard to communicate across 
country with our troops on the north of the woods; 
that thijs was his natural and only means of commu- 
nicating with the rest of the army; and that any 
communication with Pope, except in this wa}', was 
impracticable. In doing this they are given to 
understand that his forces have been over-matched 
by the enemy, that his cavalry and his messengers 
are used up or captured, and that in spite of the 
most vigorous exertions, isolated and outnumbered, 
he was forced to decide upon a retreat to Manassas 
as a matter of manifest necessity. Rut in this im- 
pression, so conve)'ed, there would not be one 
word of truth. He was not at the front, but at the 
rear, where a highwa)', traveled b\- our troops and 
wagons all da_\' long, led directly to Pope's head- 
c]uarters. He had shown his skirmish line a mo- 
ment to the enemy and drawn a few distant can- 
non shots, and had then disappeared so utterly 
that they reported him gone to take part in the 
attack upon Jackson. There is no evidence that a 
man was hurt in his command, and if his messen- 
gers were captured, it must have been b>' our own 
troops on or near the Sudley road. 

In like manner the alarming intelligence he sends, 
that the enemy was "moving largely" toward his 
left, purports to be based upon the appearance of 
the dust, and the reports of scouts. We now know 



OF BULL RUN. 



71 

from the Confederate reports that there was no mo\e- 
ment toward his left, and that every thing on the 
Confederate right was kept in a strictly defensixe 
attitude. We know also that there wer-e no ' ' scouts " 
sent out b>' him, but only a stationary line of skir- 
mishers under Marshall. The stor\- of an>' force pass- 
ing beyond his left was purel)- the invention of some 
one's fears, but it was none the less well calculated 
to discourage Pope, if it should reach him through 
McDowell. If it was an illusion which anybody 
honestly held, the vigorous advance of a few regi- 
ments in that direction would have dispelled it. 

Unless a better explanation of these things can 
be given than anywhere appears in the record of 
the Board investigation, we are warranted in say- 
jing that these dispatches alone, in connection with 
/the newly-discovered evidence as to the facts, are 
[ sufficient to support the original judgment of the 
Court-martial. The reputation of Porter and his 
troops before that time was such as to make him 
responsible for doing what a good officer could do, 
not what might be expected from a worthless one. 
It is in view of all these circumstances that the 
exhibition of moti\e shown in his letters to Burn- 
side gains double significance, and forces us to the 
conclusion that his disaffection to Pope had led 
hnn beyond the verge of criminal insubordination, 
and turned what might reasonably be expected to 



72 THE SECOND BAITLE OF BULL RUN. 

be a triumph of our arms on the 29th of August 
into the prelude of a disaster on the next da}'. 

To remit the remainder of a continuing- punish- 
ment by restoring him to citizenship, hke other acts 
of amnesty and obhvion, would be magnanimous. 
But to vote him a triumph, to record his conduct 
as the model of chivalry and excellent soldiership, 
to enrich him from the public treasur)-, to restore 
him to his rank, to retire him on pa}' ten times as 
great as the pension your maimed and crippled com- 
rades of similar grade in this Society are receiving, 
is to do dishonor to every one who realh' threw 
his soul into the struggle for his countr}'. What- 
ever may be the social or the clique influences 
which favor it or bring it about, we have no choice 
but to protest against it. However honored may 
be the names which support it, it is our solemn 
duty to say, under your leadership we did not so 
learn the art of \\'ar. Least of all can we overlook 
the fact that it was on this very field the Confederate 
General Jackson extorted the admiration of all sol- 
diers, whether friends or foes, by an audacity, a 
courage, and an intensity of will and purpose which 
marked him as a great soldier, and which were the 
ccMTipletest contrast, in every particular, with the 
conduct on which we have commented. 



^VPF»ETs^T)IX. 



I. PORTERS LETTERS TO BURNS] DE — EXTRACTS. 

From Warrexton Junctiox, August 27, 18(32. — 4 p. m. 
General Burnside, Falmouth, Va.: 

I send you the last order from General Pojie, -which 
indicates the future as well as the present. Wagons are 
rolling along rapidly to the rear, as if a mighty power was 
propelling them. I can see no cause of alarni, though this 
may cause it. McDowell is moving to Gainesville, where 
Sigel now is. The latter got to Buckland britlge in time to 
put out the fire and kick the enemy, who is pursuing his 
route unmolested to the Shenandoah, or Loudoun County. . . 

Every thing has moved up north. I found a vast diffcr- 
ance between these troops and ours, but I suppose they were 
new, as to-day they burned their clothes, etc., when there was 
not the least cau.se. I hear that they are much demoralized, 
and needed some good troops to give them heart, and, I 
think, head. We are working now to get behind Bull Run, 
and I presume will be there in a few days, if strategy don't 
use us up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the 
inverse proportion. I would like some of my ambulances. 
I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksburg, 
to push toward Hanover, or with a larger force to push to- 
ward Orange Court-house. I wish Sumner was at Wash- 



74 Al'PKNDIX. 

iiigton, and up iicMr the Monocacy, with good batteries. I 
do not douI)t (lie ciu'iny have a large amount of supjilies pro- 
vided I'or Ihem, and Uelieve they liave a (■(inlenipt lor tlie 
Army ol Virginia. 1 wish niyseli' away from it, with all 
our old Army of the I'otomae, and .so do our companions. 

There is uo fear of an enemy crossing the Rappahannock. 

The cavalry are all in the advance of the rebel army. 

Most of this is private, l)nt if you can get me away, please 
dose. Make what use of this you choose, >o it does good. 
Don't let the alarm here disturb you. if you had a good 
force you could go to Richmond. .\ lorce should be at once 
pushed on to .Alanassas to open the road. Our provisions are 
very .short. F. .1. I'uhter. 



Warhextox. 1*7. — p. M. 
To Gexerai, Rurxsipe : 

Morell left his medicine, ammunition and f>aggage at 
Kelly's ford. Can you have it hauled to Fredericksburg and 
stored? His wagons were all sent to you for grain and am- 
munition. I have sent back to you every nmn of the Finst 
and 8ixth New York Cavalry, except what has been sent to 
(iainesville. I will get them to you after awhile. Every I 
thing here is at sixes and sevens, and T find I am to take! 
care of my.self in every respect. Our liiu^ of communica-f 
lions has taken care of itself in compliance with orders. The/ 
army has not three day.s' provisions. The enemy caj)tureir 
all Pope's and other clothing; and from ^McDowell the same, 
including liquors. No guard accompanying tlie train.s, and 
small ones guard l>ridges. The wagons are rolling on, and F 
shall be here to-morrow. Oood night. 

F. J. P()i:ti;i!. ^Tajor (^Miera^ 



APPKNPIX. 75 

Font Milks ritoM Maxa88as, 28th. — 2 r. m. 

MaJOK-(tEXEUAL Bl'knside : 

All that talk about bagging Jackson, etc., was bosh. That 
cnonnous gap, Manassas, was left open and the enemy jumped 
through ; and the story of McDowell having cut off' Long- 
street had no foundation. The enemy has destroyed all our 
bridges, burned trains, etc., and made this army rush back to 
look at its line of communication, and find us bare of sub- 
sistence. We are far fnnn Alexandria, considering the means 
of transportation. Your supply train of forty wagons is 
here, but I can't find tiiem. There is a report that Jackson 
is at Centerville, wliich you can believe or not. The enemy 
destroyed an immense amount of property at Mana.ssas, cars 
and supplies. I expect the ne,\t thing will be a raid on our 
rear, by way of Warrenton pike, by Longstreet, who was cut 
otf. F. J. Porter, Major-General. 



Bristow— 6 A. M. 2*)tli 
Ma.tor-Gexeral Burnside : 

I shall be off in half an hour. The messenger who 
brought this says the enemy liad been at Centervillc. and 
pickets VN'ere found there last night. Sigel had a severe fight 
last night; took many prisoners. Banks is at Warrenton 
Junction; McDowell near Gainesville: Heintzelman and 
Reno at (Jenterville, where thev marched vesterday ; and Pope ; 
went to Centerville, with the last two as a body-guard, at the' 
time not knowing where was the enemy, and when Sigel was 
fighting within eight miles of liim and in sight. Coniment 
is unneces.sary. 

The enormous trains are still rolling on, many animals not 
being watered for fifty liours. I shall be out of provisions 
to-morrow night. Your train of fortv waoons can not be 



76 APPENDIX. 

found. I hope Mac's at work and we shall soon be ordered 
out of this. It would seem, from proper statements of the 
enemy, that he was wandering around loose, but I expect 
they know what they are doing, which is more than any one 
here or anywhere knows. F. J. Porter, Major-General. 



2. popes orders to porter. 

Head-quarters Army of Virginia, | 
Bristow Station, August 27, 1862 — 6:30. p. m. )' 
General : 

The Major-General Commanding directs that you start 
at one o'clock to-night, and come forward w'ith your whole 
corps, or such j)iirt of it as is with you, so as to be here 
I by daylight to-morrow morning Hooker has had a very 
I severe action witli the enemy, with a loss of about three hun- 
dred killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, 
but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from 
ISIanassas and clear the country between that 2>l'ice and 
Gainesville, where McDowell is. If ]Morell has not joined 
you, .send word to him to j)ush forward immediately. Also 
send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take 
your place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary on all / 
/ accounts that you should be here by daylight. T send an 
officer witli this dispatch who will conduct you to tliis place. 
Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from 
F.iyetteville, probal)ly in the direction of Bealeton. Say to 
Banks, also, that he bad best run back the railroad trains to 
this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him to 
that effect. 

By command of Ma.tor-General Pope. 

George D. Rfggees, Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-General F. J. Porter, Warrenton Junction. 



APPENDIX. 



17 



P. 8. — If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a 
regiment of iniantry and two jiieces of artillery as a guard 
till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately. 
If Banks is not at the Junction, instruct Colonel Clary to 
ruu the trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a 
regiment and section of artillery with it. 

By comnuind of Major-General Pope. 

George D. Ruggles, Colonel and Chief of Staff. 



Head-quarters Army of Virginia, | 
Near Bull Run, Amjmt 29, 1862.— 3 a m. ) 

General ; 

McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson ; Sigel 

is immediately on the right of McDowell ; Kearney and 

Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at eaily dawn. 

Major-Gen. Pope directs you to move upon Centerville at 

the first dawn of day with your whole command, leaving 

your trains to follow. It is very important that you should/ 

^ be here at a very early hour in tlie morning. A severe en- 

t gagement is likely to take place and your presence is neces- 

' sary. I am. General, very respectfully, 

Your obedient Servant, 

George D. Ruggles, Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

Major-General Porter. 



Heap-quarters Army of Virginia, 
Centerville, Avgmt 29, 1862. 

Major-Genera L Porter : 

Push forward with your corps and King's division, which 

you will take with you, upon Gainesville. I am following 

the enemy down tlie Warrenton turnpike. Be expeditious 

or we will lose much. John Pope, 

Majo'--General Commanding. 



yS APPENDIX. 

HeADQUAJ!'I'I:1!S AkMV ok VllU.INIA, I 

Center viLLK, Ain/ii.sf 21», 1802. j' 
Generals McDowell and Poktek : 

Voii will plrase move forwanl witli your joint coni- 
nuviuls toward Gainesvillf. I st'iit (k'neral Porttr written 
1 orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzehnan, 
iSigel and lleuo are moving on the Warrenton turnjjikc, and 
must now lie not far from GainesviUe. 1 desire that as soon 
as comniunication is established between this force and your 
owji, the whole eomnuind shall lialt. It may be necessary to 
fall back behind Bull Run at Centerville to-night. I presume 
it will be so on account of our suj)|>]ies I have sent no 
orders of any descri|)tion to Kicketts, and none to interfere 
in any way with the movements of ^IcDowell's troops, except 
what I sent l)y his ;ide-de-cami) last night, which were to 
hold his ])osition on the Warrenton pike until the troops 
from heri' should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do 
not even know Ricketts' position, as ] have not been able to 
find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this 
morning. General McDowell will take immediat-e steps to 
communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to re- 
join the other divisions of his corps as .soon as practicable. 
If any considerable advantages niv to be gained by depart- 
ing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out. One 
thing must be held in view, the troojis must occupy a posi- 
tion from which they can reach Ihill Run to-night or by 
morning. The indications are that the whole force of the 
enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring 
them here I )y to-morrow night oi' next day. My own head- 
quarters will be, for the present, with Heintzclman's corps, 
or at this |)lace. 

Idiiv Pori;, Major-General Counnanding. 



APPENDIX. 79 

HkAD-QUAKTEKS IX THE FlELD, I 

August 29, 18(J2. 4:80, P. M. ) 

Your line of luarcli l)rings you in on the enemy's riglil 

tl;ink. I des^iiv you to push forward into action at once on 

tlie enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your 

right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy 

is massed in the woods in front of us, but he can be shelled 

out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves 

and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all 

the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to 

your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication 

with the right wing. 

John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 

To Major-General Porter. 



Head-qua rtekb Army of Virginia, ' 

In the Field near Bull Run, August 29, 1862. 8;50 p.m. | 

General: 

Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour 
of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will marcli 
your command to the field of battle of to-day, and rejjort to 
me in person for orders. \ou are to understand that you 
are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be 
present on the field within three hours after its reception or 
after day-break to-morrow morning. 

John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General F. J. Porter. 



3. PORTER S DLSPATCHES TO MCDOWELL. 

Generals McDowell or King : 

T have been wandering over the woods, and failed to get 



8o APPENDIX. 

;i coiuiiiuniciitioii to you. Tell how matters go with you. 
The enemy is in strong t\)rce in front of me, and I wish to 
know your designs for to-night. If left to me I shall have 
to retire for food and water, which I can not get here. How 
goes the battle? It seems to go to our rear. The enemy 
are getting to our left. 

F. J. PoRTEU, 3Iajor-General Volunteers 

Generals McDowell & King : 

I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the 
woods to Groveton. The enemy ai'e in force on this road 
and as they appear to have driven our forces back, the fire 
of the enemy having advanced, and ours retired, I have de- 
termined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to 
communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers 
iiave run intu the enemy. They have gathered artillery and 
cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust 
show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the 
head of the column to see what is passing and how affairs 
are going, and I will communicate with you. Had you not 
better send your train back. 

F. J. Porter, Major-General. 



General McDowell : 

Failed in getting .AForell over to you. After wandering 
about the woods for a time, I withdrew him, and, wliile 
doing so, artillery opened upon us. My scouts could not 
get through. Each one found the enemy between us, and I 
believe some have been captured. Infantry are also in front. 
I am trying to get a battery, but have not succeeded as yet. 
From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports of 
scouts, think the eiicmv are moving largelv in that wav. 



APPENDIX. 51 

Please communicate this way tlii.s messenger came. I have 
no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your 
designs, whether you retire or not. I can not get water, and 
am out of provisions. Have lost a few men from infantry, 
tiring. F. J. Pt)RTER, Major-General Volunteers. 

At/g. 29, () p. M. 



4. DISPATCHES OF OTHER OFFICERS. 

Ain/mt 29, 1862. 8:30 o'doc/:. 
General MoRKLL: 

General Porter desires you to keep closed up and see 

that the ammunition train, which is, I learn, at Manassas, is 

put in with our train. Yours respectfully, 

George Sykes. 



Endorsed. Manassas Junction. 

General : 

There is an ammunition train here belonging to King's 
division; nothing for us. 

George W. Morell, Major-General. 
To Major-General Porter. 



Head-quarters Cavalry Brigade. 9:30 a. m. 
Seventeen regiments, one battery and five hundred cav- 
alry passed through Gainesville three quarters of an hour 
ago, on the Centerville road. I think this division should 
join our forces now engaged at once. Please forward this. 
John Buford, Brigadier-General. 
To General Ricketts. 



r-h. 45m. P. M., Aug. 29, '62. 
General Sykes: 

I received an order from Mr. Cutting to advance and 

support INIorell. I faced about and did so. I soon met 
6 



82 APPENDIX. 

Kxriffiii's briijade witlulrawiiig l)y order of General Morell, 
Iwlio was not pushed out. but returning. I faeed alwut and 
marched back two hundred yards or so. I then met an 
iirderly from General Porter to General Morell, saying he 
must push on and press the enemy ; that all was going well 
for us, and he wti s re turning. Griffin then faced about, and 
lam following him to support General Morell, as ordered. 
None of the batteries are closed up to me. 
Respectfully, 

(;. K. W.MtKEX. 



DISPATCHES BETWEEN PORTER AND MORELL.* 
(vol. 2, PP. 26-27.) 

I- Prit , 

General: Colonel [Marshall reports that two batteries 
have come down in the woods on our right, toward the rail- 
road, and two regiments of infantry on the road. If this be 
so, it will be hot here in the morning. 

(Jeu. W . Morell, Major-General. 
To General Porter. 

(This was returned to Morell endorsed as follows:) 
II. 

Move the infantry and everything behind the crest and 
jconceal the guns. We must hold that place and make it 
too hot for them. Come the same game over them they do 
'•over us, and get your men out of sight. 

F. J. Porter. 



-Col. Mar.shall's testimony on page 115 fixes the time of iiis 
information toMoroU, wliicli uuist have procedoU all these, a.s be- 
iVeeii tliice and (bur v. m. 



APPENDIX. 83 

III. 

General Portei*. : I ciui move everything out of sight hut 

Hazlitt'.s buttery. (Iriffin is sup2)orting it, and is on its 

right, principally in the pine bushes. The otlier batteries 

and briga<les are retired out of sight. Is this what you 

mean by every tiling ? 

(Ieo. W. Morell, Major-General. 

(Indorsed as follows:) 

IV. 

CtEXERxVL Morelj. : I tliiiik you ean move Hazlilt's bat- 
tery, or the most of it, and post him in the bushes with the 
others, so as to deceive. I would get every thing, if 
possible, in ambuscade. All goes well with the other troops. 

F. J. P. 
V. 

General Morell: Tell me what is passing, quickly. If 
the enemy is C(»ming, hold to him, andlwill come up. Post 
your men to repulse liiiu. 

F. J. Porter, Major-General. 

VI. 

General Morell: Push over to the aid of Sigel, and 
strike in his rear. If you reach a road up which King is 
moving, and he has got ahead of you, let him pass; but 
see if you can not give help to 8igel. If you fiiul him retir- 
ing move back toward Manassas, and should necessity re- 
quire it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centerville. 
If you find the direct road filled, take the one via Union 
Mills, which is to the right as you return. 

F. J. PoRTEP.. ^lajor-General. 

Look to the points of the comjjass for Manas.sa.s. 



84 APPENDIX. 



•VII. 

General Morkll: Hold on, if you can, to your present 
place. Wl);it is passing? F. J. PORTEK. 

vin. 

General Porter: Colonel Marshall reports a movement 
in front of his left. I think we had better retire. No in- 
\\ fantry in sight, and I am continuing the movement. 

Stay where you are, to aid me if necessary. Morele. 



IX. 

General Morell: I have all within reach of you. T 
wi.sh you to give the enemy a good shelling without wasting 
ammunition, and }>ush at the .same time a party over to .see 
what is going on. We can not retire while ^IcDowell holds 
his own. F. J. P. 

X. 

General Morell ; I wish you to push uj) two regiments 
supported by others, preceded by skirmishers, the regiments 
at intervals of 200 yards, and attack the section of artillery 
opposed to you. The battle works well on our right, and the 
enemy are .said to be retiring up the j)ikc. Give the enemy 
a good shelling as our troops advance. 

F. J. Porter, Major-General Commanding. 

XI. 

General Morell: Put your men in j)osition to remain 
during the night, and have out your pickets. Put them so 
that they will be in jiosition to resist any thing. I am about 
a mile from you. McDowell says all goes well, and we are 



APPENDIX. 85 

getting the best of the fight. I wish you would send me a 
dozen men from tliiit cavalry. 

F. J. PoBTER, Major-General. 
Keep me informed. Troops are pa.ssing up to Gainesville, 
pushing the enemy. Ricketth' has gone, also King.* 



5. REPORTS OF U. S. OFFICERS — EXTRACTS. 

Major-Gf.nreal Heiktzelman : 

"At 10 A. M. I reached the field of battle, a mile from 
Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike. General Kearney's 
division had proceeded to the right and front. I learned 
that General 8igel was in command of the troops then 
engaged. At 11 A. M. the head of Hooker'.s division arrived. 
General Reno an hour later. ...... 

The firing continued some time after dark, and when it 
ceased, we remained in possession of the battle-field." 

Brigadier-General Schenck. {He being disabled by a 
uyjund, his report imoi made by Colonel Checsebroiu/h, his 
Adjufanf-Genernl. ) 

'■ It was at this time, one or two o'clock, that a line of skir- 
mishers were observed approaching us from the rear, they 
proved to be of General Reynolds. We communicated with 
General Reynolds at once, who took his position on our left, 
and at General Schenck's suggestion he .sent a battery to our 
right in the woods for the ]iurj)Ose of flanking the enemy, 
'i'hey secured a position, and were engaged with him about 
an hour, luit with wliat result we were not informed. Gen- 



*The order of these dispatches is that in which they were arranged 
by General Morell in his testimony. None of them have the hour 
jioted upon tlieiu. 



86 APPENDIX. 

I'ral Reynolds now sent us word tbul lie luid discovered the 
enemy bearing down upon his left in heavy cohunns, 
and that he intended to fall back to the first woods beliind 
the cleared space, and had already put his troops in motion. 
We therefore accommodated our.selves to his movement." 

BRIGADlER-trEN'ERAL IvKYNOLDS. {SiipplniiinidI rrport re- 
ferring to (JobnirJ (.'/iccsrhrdin/li.) 

" r sent no word to ({eneral 8chcnek of the kind indicated 
in this paper of the movement of the enemy at the time tliis 
change of position was made, nor at any time. There was a 
report came later in the evening that the enemy were moving 
over the pike, but I am not aware that I connnuiiicated it to 
General Schenck, as at that time I had no connection with 
him." 

Colonel Cheesebrough. {Exjjlunatory of foregoing.) 

"General Reynolds did not communicate directly with 
General Schenck, as it would appear from my report, but the 
information was received through Colonel McLean who toKl 
General Schenck that General Reynolds had informed him 
that 'the enemy was hearing down, etc., and that he (Rey- 
nolds) intended to fall back, and has actually commenced the 
movement.' Colonel McLean wished to know if he should 
act accordingly. General Schenck directed him to accom- 
modate himself to General Reynolds' movenu'nt.s." 



6. REPORTS OF CONFEDERATE OFFICERS — EXTRACTS. 

General R. E. Lee. Official Report. 

" Longstreet entered the turnpike near Gainesville, and 
nu)ving down toward Groveton, the head of liis column came 
upon the field in rear of the enemy's left, which had already 



APPENDIX. Sy 

opened with artillery upon Juekson's right, as previously 
described. He immediately placed some of his batteries \n 
po.sition, but before he could complete dispositions to attac^k, 
the enemy withdrew; not, however, without loss from our 
artillery. Lougstreet took position on the right of Jackson, 
Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deployed 
across the turnpike, and at right angles to it. These troojxs 
were supported on the left by three brigades under General 
AVilcox, and by a like force on the right under General 
Ivemper. D. R. Jones' division formed the extreme right of 
the line, resting on the Manasses Gap Railroad. The cavalry 
guarded our right and left flanks, that on the right being 
under General Stuart in person. After the arrival of Long- 
street, the enemy changed his position, and began to con- 
centrate opposite Jackson's left, opening a brisk artillery fire, 
which was responded to with effect by some of General 
A. P. Hill's batteries. Colonel Walton placed a part of his 
artillery ujjon a commanding position between Generals 
Jackson and Longstreet, by order of tlie latter, and engaged 
the enemy vigorously for several hours. 

"Soon afterwards General Stuart reported the approach of a 
large force from the direction of Bristow Station, threatening 
Longstreet's right. The brigades under General Wilcox i 
were sent to re-enforce General Jones, but no s;^erious attack 
was made, and after firing a few shots the enemy withdrew. 
While this demonstration was being made on otir right, a 
hirge force advanced to assail the left of Jackson's position, 
occupied by the division of General A. P. Hill. The attack 
was received by his troops with their accustomed steadiness, 
and the battle raged with great fury. ..... 

"While thenSattle was raging "on Jack.son's left. General 
TiOngstreet ordered Hood and Evans to advance, but before 
the order could be obeve<l. Hood was Inmself attacked, ami 



88 Al'I'ENDlX. 

liis coiiiinaiul nt once iKTaiiu' warmly engaged. General 
Wjlcox was recalled t'roni the right and ordered to advance 
on Hood's left, and one of Kemper's brigades, under Colonel 
liunton, moved forward on his right." 

Gknhral James Lu.ng!STKKKT. Off'ciid Report. 

" (Jn approaching the tield some of Brig.-(ien. Hood's 
batteries were ordered into positi(m, and his division was de- 
ployed on the riglit and left of the turnpike, at right angles 
with it, and supported by Brig.-Gen. Evans' brigade. Before 
these batteries could open, the enemy discovered our move- 
ments, and withdrew his left. Another battery, C.aptain 
Stribling's, was placed upon a commanding position to my 
right, which played upon the rear of the enemy's left, and 
drove him entirely from that part of the field. He changed 
his front rapidly so as to meet the advance of Hood and 
Evans. Their brigades, under General Wilcox, were thrown 
forward to the support of the left, and three others, under 
General Kemper, to the support of the right of those com- 
mands. Gen. D. R. Jones' division was placed ujjon the 
Manassas Gap Railroad to the right and in echelon with re- 
gard to the three last brigades. Colonel Walton placed his 
batteries in a commanding position between my line and 
that of General Jackson, and engaged the enemy for several 
hours in a severe and successful artillery duel. At a late 
hour in the day, Major-General Stuart reported the approacii 
of tlie enemy in heavy columns against my extreme right. 
I withdrew General Wilcox with his three brigades, from 
the left, and placed his command in a position to support 
Jones in case of an attack against my right. After some 
few sliots the enemy withdrew his forces, moving tliem 
around toward his front, and about four o'clock in the after- 
noon bei^an to press forward against General Jackson's posi- 
tion. Wilcox's brigades were moved l)ack to their former 



APPENDIX. 89 

position, and llouds two l)rigade^, supported by Evans, were 
<lulcHy~pressed forward to the attack. At the same time 
Wileox's three brigades made a lilve advance, as also Hun- 
Ion's brigade of Kemper's command." 
CrEXERAL A. P. HiLL. Official Report. 

"Friday morning, in accordance with orders from General 
Jackson, I occupied the line of the unfinished railroad, my 
extreme left resting near Sudley's Ford ; my right near the 
point where the road strikes the open field 

"The evident intention of the enemy this day was to turn 
our left and ov(>rwhelm Jackson's corps before Longstreet 
came up; and to accomplish this, the most persistent and 
furious onsets were made by column after column of infantry, 
accompanied by numerous batteries of artillery. Soon my 
reserves were all in, and up to six o'clock my division, as- 
sisted by the Louisi;iM:i brigade of General Hays, com- 
manded by Cok)nel Forno, with an heroic courage and ob- 
stinacy almost beyond parallel, had met and rej)u!sed six 
distinct and sei»ar:ite assaults, a jiortion of the time the ma- 
jority of the men being without a cartridge." ' 
General J. E. I). Sttaut. Offirial Repori. 

"The next moriung (29th) in pursuance of General Jack- 
son's wishes, I set out aguin to endeavor to establish com- 
munications with Longstreet, from whom he had received a 
favorable report the night before. Just after leaving the 
Sudley road, my i)arty was fired on from the wood bordering 
the road, which was in rear of Jackson's lines, and which 
the enemy had penetrated with a small force, it was after- 
ward ascertained, and ca{)tured some stragglers. They were 
between General .Tackson and his baggage, at Sudley. 

I met with the head of General Longstreets column be- 
tween Havmarket and ( rainesville, and then communicated 



90 APPENDIX. 

lo the Commanding Ciencnil, General Jack.son's position and 
the enemy's. I then passed the cavalry througii the column 
so as to place it on Longstreet's right flank, and advanced 
directly toward Manassas, while the column kept directly 
down the pike to join General Jackson's right. I selected a 
fine position for a battery on tlie right, and one having been 
sent to me, I lired a few shots at the enemy's supposed posi- 
tion which induced him to shift his position. 

(reneral Robertson, who, with his command, was sent to 
reconnoiter further down the road toward ]Manassas, reported 
the enemy in his front. Upon repairing to that front, I 
foitnd that Rosser's regimenj was engiiged with the enemy 
to the left of the road, and Robertson's videttes had found 
the enemy approaching from the direction of Bristow station 
toward Sudley. The prolongation of liis line of march 
would have pas.sed through my position, which was a very 
fine one for artillery as well as observation, and struck Long- 
street in flank. I waited his approach long eiiough to ascer- 
tain that there was at least an army corps, at the same time 
keeping detachments of cavalry dragging brush down the 
road from the direction of Gainesville, so as to deceive the 
enemy (a ru.<e which Porter's report shows was successful), 
and notified the Commanding (Jeneral, then opposite me on 
the turnpike, that Longstreet's flank and rear were seriously 
threatened, and of the importance to us of the ridge I tlien 
held. Immediately upon tlie receipt of tliat intelligence, 
Jenkins', Kemper's and D. R. Jones' brigades and several 
pieces of artillery were ordered to me by (Jeneral Long- 
street, and, being placed in i)osition fronting Bri.stow, awaited 
the enemy's advance. After exchanging a few shots with! 
rifled pieces, this cor{)s withdrew toward 3Ianassas, leavingjj 
artillery and supports to hold the position till night." 



APPENDIX. 91 

Gexeral J E. B. .Stuakt. MmKirantld iixalr parf nf liia 
rcp'jrt. 

"Friday, August 29th. As General Stuart vodo forward, 
toward Groveton, about ten o'clock a. m., lie found the 
enemy's sharpshooters had penetrated the woods, going to- 
ward the ambuhmces and train, threatening to cut them oif. 
He at once directed Captain Pelham, of tlie Stuart Horse 
Artillery, who was near by, to shell the woods, and gather 
up all the stragglers around the train and drive back the 
enemy, notifying General Jackson in the meantime of what 
was transpiring. ......... 

" (reneral Stuart al.so sent Colonel Bayh)r, who was near the 
railroad embankment, in command of the Stonewall brigade, 

etc Having ordered Captain Pelham to 

report to General .Jackson, General Stuart went toward Hay- 
market to establish communication with Generals Lee and 
Long.street, accompanied by Brigadier-General Robertson, 
with a portion of hi.s, and a portion of General F. Lee'.s 
cavalry." 

General JuBAL A. Early (of Jackson's command), Official 
Report. 

" Early next morning (August 29th), the division was 
formed on a ridge perpendicular to the railroad track, with 
the right resting on the Warrenton turnpike and facing to- 
ward Groveton. In a short time thereafter, I received an 
order from General Jackson to move, with my own and Hays' 
brigade, to a ridge west of the turnpike aiul the railroad 
track, so as to prevent the enemy from flanking our forces 
on the right, a movement from the direction of Manassas 
indicating that purpose having been ol)served. 
When this corps (Longstreets) had advanced sufficiently far 
to render it unnecessary for me to remain longer in my posi- 
tion, or for the Thirteenth and Thirtv-lirst regiments to re- 



92 APl'KNDIX. 

main whoro tlu'v \v(m-c, I recalled them and moved to the 
Icl't for the purpose of rejoining the rest of the division. 

" I found (Jeneral Lawton, with his brigade, in the woods, 
not far from the position at which I had been the evening 
before, but formed in line so as to be i)arallel to the railroad, 
Trimble's brigade being posted on the railroad cut, on the 
right of our line as thus contracted. I was ordered by Gen- 
eral Lawton to form my brigade in line in rear of his brigade, 
and Colonel Forno was directed to form on my right. 

" Shortly after this the enemy began his attempts to drive 
our troops from the line of the railroad, and about half-past 
three,- P. M., Colonel Forno was ordered to advance to the 
front by General Jackson, to the support of one of General 
A. P. Hill's brigades." 

General C. M. ^VILCox. Official Beport. 

" Hopewell Gap is about three miles from Thoroughfare 
Gap, being connected with the latter on the cast by two 
roads, one of which is impracticable for wagons. The enemy 
had been at this pass during the day, but retired before 
night, thus giving us a free passage. Early the following 
morning our march was resumed, and the command rejoined 
at half-past nine a. m., the remainder of the division at the 
intersection of the two roads leading from the gaps above 
mentioned. 

Pursuing our line of march together with the division, we 
passed by Gainesville and, advancing some three miles beyond, 
my three brigades were formed in line of battle on the left 
and at right angles to the turnpike. Having advanced near 
three-quarters of a niil(>, we were then halted. The enemy 
was in our front and not far distant. Several of our bat- 
teries were placed in position on a commanding eminence to 
the left of the turnjiike .\ cannonading ensued, and eon- 



AHPKNDIX. 93 

tinned for an hour or two, to whicli the enemy's artilU'iy 
replied 

" At half-past four or five P. M., the three brigades were 
moved across to tiu^ right of the turnpike, a mile or more, to 
.the Manassas Gap Railroad. While here musketry was heard 
to our left, on the turnpike. This hriiig eontinued with more 
or less vivacity till sundown. Now the command was or- 
dered back to the turnpike, and forward on this to the sup- 
port of General Hood, who had become engaged with the 
enemy and had driven him back some distance, inflicting 
severe loss upon iiiin, being checked in his successes by the 
darkness of the night." 
Ma-IOR S. H. IIaikstox, (Stuart's cavalry). Oficial Report. 

Gainesville, August 29, 18G2, 8 p. m. 
" To CoLOXEL Ciui/rox, .\ssistant Adjutant-General: 

" In ob,Mlience to (jeneral Lee's order I started this morning 
at eight o'clock with one hundre<l and fifty cavalry to go to 
Warrenton, ' to find out if any of the enemy's forces were 
still in the vicinity of that place.' T went from Thorough- 
fare to the right on a by-roa.d, which took me into the Win- 
chester road two miles below Warrenton, and came up to 
the rear of the town. I inquired of the citizens and persons 
I met on the way, but could not hear that any of their forces 
were in the vicinity of that place. Tiny informed me that 
the last left yesterday in the direction of Gainesville and War- 
renton Junction." 



7. ORAL TESTIMONY. 

PASSAGES REFERKKI) TO IN THE TEXT. EXTRACTS. 

W. L. B. Wheeler (Citizen). Record, Vol. 3, pp. 110!»-11. 

Q. Did Bethlehem church have a spire on it on the 29th 

of August, 18(i2? A. It never has had since I have known 



94 APPENDIX. 

It. Q. 1 [ow long have you known it? .1. I .suppose I have 
known it .since I was eight years old. I went to sehool there 

in 1834 

Q. Relative to Bethlehem ehureli, when did the walls fall 
in of that strueture? A. I eould not say when, because I 
did not see it until the .spring of LS02. I did not even know 
that of my own knowledge, but I understood that the South- 
ern .•soldiers had taken the inside woodwork in building their 
winter-quarters. (^. When did it fall in? ^1. During the 
winter. Q. During the winter of 1862? A. Yes. lean not 
.say the exact month or week that they commenced talcing 
timbers from the house. It was a very old frame building. 

John T. Lea{'HMA>' (Citizen). Record, Vol. 3, 7>7a Illo-G. 

Q. I did not recollect whether you testified about Bethle- 
hem churcli on your former examination? A. I did not; I 
do not think. Q. Did Bethlehem church ever have a spire 
to it? ^1. No, sir. Q. Or a belfry ? .4. No, sir. . . . 
Q. Of what material was it? A. The house was built of 
brick 

Q. What is that hill at IMonroe's called? A. I never 
heard it called any thing but IMonroe's hill, until since the war 
I have heard it called frequently Stuart's Hill. Q. How 
long after the war did you hear it called that? A. Eeally, 
I could not say ; very frequently. T reckon that very soon 
after tiie war it was called Stuart's Hill. Q. Never heard a 
reason ascribed for it? ,1. Yes, I did. I heard that Stuart 
was on that hill during the 29th, and T thiidc the family of 
Monroe, from that circumstance, called it Stuart's Hill. It 
is a short distance from Monroe's house." 

CtEXER.\lOrlaxdo M. Poe (U. S. Engineers). Vol. 2, pji. 
■ 579-80. 
"We fornie(l lu'tween the INfattliews liouse and tlu^ mail — 



APPENOIX. 95 

our left resting on the road — formed in line of liattle and 
moved directly forward, our left toucliiiig the road, toward 
P>ull Run, nearly due north. We continued that movement 
until wo crossed Bull lUin, or at least a portion of the bri- 
gade; two regiments did not cross; advanced some distance 
to the north of Bull Run, two or three hundred yards, per- 
haps; and after perhaps an hour there, we were recalled. Or 
at least from the time that we got across until we got back, 
was perhaps an hour. . . Q. What was your 

position at that time in reference to the rest of General Pope's 
army? A. The extreme right flank, so far as I know; the 

right flank of the infantry, certainly (}. What 

time do you fix it to have been in the morning that that ar- 
tillery opened on you when in that advanced i>osition ? 
A. About eleven o'clock, I should think. I a.ssnme it at 
that ; I did not look at my watch. Q. Nearer ten or nearer 
twelve? si. I should say about eleven. That is an estimate 
I made some years ago and i)ut in writing at that time. I 
see no reason to change it. 

General Samuei> P. Heintzelman, Coimnandbin Tliird 
Army Corps. Vol. 2, p. (504. 

Q. Did you keep a di:iry of events that transpired? 
A. Yes, I carried a memorandum book in my j^ocket, and I 
made a note of every thing that was brought to me that 1 
supposed would be of use to me in making my rei)orts. 
Q. When did you make these notes? A. On the spot, durijig 
the day. 

(Extracts from diary read) ... At ten a. m. 
reached the field, a mile from the Stone Bridge. Firing going 
on, and I called upon General Sigel. General Kearney was 
at the right. Part of General Hooker's division I sent to 
support some of Sigel's troop.s. . General Hooker got up about 



96 APPENDIX. 

11 A. M. General Reno nearly an hour later. Soon after 
General Pope arrived — about quarter to two. 1 rode to the 
old Bull Run battle-field where my troops were. The enemy 
we drove back in the direction of Dudley Cliurch, and they 
are now making another stand. We are hoping for McDo^vell 
and Porter." 

Colonel Samuel N. Benjamin, Amstant Adjutant-General, 
United .Stated Army. V(jI. 2, j)p- 60(5-608. 

Q. What rank did you hold and command on the 29th of 
August, 1862? A. I was first lieutenant in the Second 
United States Artillery, in command of battery E. 
I got into action, as near as I can recollect, a little after 
tw^elve o'clock ; but 1 can not be very certain of the hour. 
Q. With wliat command were you on duty at that time ? 
A. I went up there with Stevens' division,* and before I got 
into action I was ordered to report to Sigel ; I reported to Gen- 
eral Schenck. I am not sure that I saw General Sigel at all. 
I went to my battery, and got it on the road, 
and brought it back and put it in position on the ridge, just 
this side of Groveton, about 200 yards from the house. . . 
Soon after that the enemy opened fire upon me ; they lay on 
a ridge. I did not see any of their men to the left of the pike, 
but on the right, according to my recollection, there were 
eighteen guns, ranging from 1,000 to 1,100 yards, about 
1,")00 yards from me. Q. About what time did 

you take that position ? A. As near as I can recollect, half- 
j)ast twelve. Q. At that time every thing was very still? 
A. Very still at the time I got up there. I had heard firing 
before. Q. How long did it remain still? A. About an 
hour or more, then T got engaged myself. Q. How long did 



Stevens' division wus in Reno's ninth corps. 



APPENDIX. 97 

you remain at that point ? A. 1 must have remained at that 
point over three liours; then I went on the road to near the 
Stone house. I had suffered very heavily in men and mate- 
rial, and I re-organized my battery. 

(tENERAL Robert C. Schenck, Commanding Divmon Sigel's 
Corps. Vol. 3, pp. 1008, 1012. 

Q. Where was that (your) division early on the morning 
of that day, August 29th. A. We were upon the hills below 
Bull Run, up in the neighborhood of Young's Creek. 
Q. What formation was your division in? A. I had Stahel's 
brigade upon the right, and McLean's brigade to the left, 
moving along south of and parallel to the turnpike. 
Q. At what time of day did you reach your farthest point in 
advance? A. I think it must have been somewhere about 
the middle of the day, perhaps a little earlier than the middle 
of the day. Q. Did you see General Reynolds' division dur- 
ing that day ? A. No, but I understood he was off on my 
left. Q. Did you see General Reynolds himself during the 
morning or afternoon ? A. No, I think not; I don't recollect. 
Q. How far did you get beyond the Gibbon woods, in Avhich 
the wounded of the night before were? A. I don't know 
that we got beyond the Gibbon woods. My remembrance is 
that the farthest point we reached was somewhere about the 
west edge of the Gibbon wood — that is, the wood in which 
Gibbon's troops were engaged the night before. We found 
there his wounded, and the evidence of the battle that had 
taken place. . , . Q. At what time did you 

quit, with your division, this Gibbon wood? A. I should 
think, to the best of my recollection, somewhere between 
one and three o'clock. I don't think I can be more positive 
than that. My recollection is that it was sometime after 
noon. Q. To what point did you then go with your division? 
7 



98 



APPENDIX. 



A. In consequence of reports made to me in reference to the 
movements of General Reynolds, I thought it best for me to 
fall back, and I came into a strip of woods which I suppose 
to be these. (South of the 'ville' in 'Gainesville' on War- 
ren's map.) I formed in line of battle near the west edge of 
that woods. There we lay most of the al'ternoon. 
Q. With reference to your advanced point, where were you 
at the time Benjamin was placed where his batteries were? 
A. That I can not tell. Q. Have you any recollection as to 
wliether you were then in Gibbon's wood? A. I do not 
recollect. My impression, rather, is that I was not at that 
time in Gibbon's wood. Q. How long after Benjamin being 
placed in that position do you think that you reached Gib- 
bon's wood? A. I can not tell you. Q. How long after that 
opening fire began with such severity upon Benjamin ? 
A. After he was placed there. Q. Yes? A. I think he had 
occupied the position for some little time. Perhaps half an 
hour or more. He was firing an occasional shot before the 
enemy seemed to discover his range and position, and con- 
centrated their fire upon him. 

General N. C. McLean, Colonel Commanding Brigade 
SchencFs Division. Vol. 2, pp. 883, 884. 

Q. Where were you on that morning (29th)? A. On the 
battle-field of Bull Run. Q. Wliat time did you go into 
action? A. We were ordered quite early in the day, as I 
supposed at the time on the extreme left of our troops; we 
advanced toward the position of the enemy in line of battle, 
with a very heavy line of skirmi'^hers. the skirmishers en- 
gaged more or less as we advanced, sometimes severely, some- 
times very lightly, but the opposition to us was not so heavy 
as to prevent our advance. We advanced slowly and regu- 
larly; that was the condition of affairs. We halted at times 



APPENDIX. 



99 



to examine tlie })Ositi()ii, and then went on again until the 
afternoon. Quite late in the afternoon we were ordered back 
into camp. During the day, exactly at what portion of tlie 
'lay I can not now state, General Meade came to nie, and 
.said he was ordered to take position on our left; he was in 
General Reynolds' division. General Meade was commandinii 
the brigade. Q. George D. Meade? A. Yes; afterward 
Commander of the Army of the Potomac. I halted and he 
came up with his troops; we then went on, and he took posi- 
tion on our left. Some time afterward — the intervals of time 
I can not give you at all, regulated more by events than time 
tiien — General Meade came back with his brigade, saying to 
me that he had placed a buttery, and he had been shelled out 
of his position by the rebel batteries, and had got into a 
hornet's nest of batteries: he was then coming back and ad- 
vised me to do the same. I reported to General Schencdv, 
my division commander, the facts, and in a short time we 
were ordered back a little distance, and remained there until 
night-fall. . . Q. How far do you suppose you ad- 
vanced forward? .,^1. I can not give you an estimate; we 
were in line of battle the whole time, from the time we 
moved early in the morning. We moved along for some 
time before we found any i"eply to our skirmishers; then it 
was continuous dropping fire; sometimes it was very severe, 
and sometimes not severe. We kept advancing very slowly ; 
occasionally we would halt and skirmish along to find out 
where we were, and what the enemy were doing, and then 
advance again. That was kept up all the day until in the 
afternoon, when General Meade came back; we did not ad- 
vance any uKjre after that. 



lOO AI'PENDIX. 

General John F. Reynolds (Coinmaiuling division Mc- 
Dowell's corps), Vol. l,p. IGG. 
Q. Do you, or not, know where the enemy's right flank 
was on the afternoon of the 21)th, say towards sunset. A. 
I was on the extreme left of our troops facing the enemy, and 
their right towards sunset had been extended across the pike, 
with fresh troops coming down the Warrenton turnpike. But 
up to twelve or one o'clock it was not across the pike, and I 
had myself made an attack on their right with my division, 
but was obliged to change front to meet the enemy coming 
down the Warrenton pike. I was forming my trooj)s paral- 
lel to the pike, to attack the enemy's right, which was 
on the other side of the pike, but was obliged to change from 
front to rear on the right, to face the troops coming down 
the turnpike. That was, I suppose, as late as one o'clock, 
and they continued to come in there until they formed and 
extended across the turnpike. . . . Q. Did you 
see any of the enemy's ft)rces on the 29th, on the south of 
the pike leading from Gainesville to Groveton, and do you 
not know that the right of the enemy's line rested on the north 
of that road? A. Their line changed during the day. I 
was on their right up to twelve o'clock, or about that time. 
In the afternoon it was extended across the pike. I can not 
state how far ; the country was very wooded there, and I 
could not see how far across it was. I thought at the time, 
they were extending it tliat afternoon until dark. 
Q. On the 29th of August, did or did not the enemy's right 
outflank your left at any time? A. I think it did towards 
evening. It was late, not dark, towards thedusk of the evening. 
Q. Did the enemy outflank you at sunset of the 29th? 
A. My division, with a brigade of Sigel's corps, lost connec- 
tion for a time with the remainder of Sigel's corps, but at 
sunset we had closed in to the right, so that the enemy, I 



APPENDIX. lOl 

think, did outflank us at sunset. That is, I think his flank 
extended beyond ours, although distant from us; not near 
enough to be engaged. 

Colonel Thomas L. Rosser (Confederate in Stuart's cav- 
alry), Vol. 3, 2^- 1073. 

Q. Did you join General Stuart that morning (29th); if 
so, state at what time and narrate what happened. A. At 
daylight I moved out, crossing the Alexandria and Warren- 
ton turnpike, and occupied a road leading off" to Manassas 
Junction, a mile or two beyond the turnpike. At this point, 
about ten o'clock, I was joined by General Stuart and his 
staff. Longstreet's command was coming in in a very forced 
and disordered march from the direction of Thoroughfare 
Gap, moving rapidly and straggling badly. My position was 
taken up with reference to their |:)rotection from a gun of 
the enemy, who were in my front. When Stuart joined me 
he notified me that the enemy was moving on our riglit 
flank, and orderd me to move my command up and down 
the dusty road, and to drag bru.sh, and thus create a heavy 
dust as though troops were in uaotion. I kept this up at 
least four or five hours. 

Major B. S. White (Confederate on General Stuart's 
staff). Vol. 3, pp. 983-991. 
Q. Where were you on the morning of Friday, August 
29th, 1862? A. Near Sudley church. Q. Do you know any 
thing that transpired in your immediate vicinity on that 
morning? If so, what was it? A. On that morning we were 
looking south ; there were some troops appeared on our left. 
Federal troops, and there was some little confusion in our 
ambulance train just north of Sudley Springs. Q. What 
then transpired ? A. There were some artillery and troops 
])ut in position to open on the enemy in that direction (wit- 



102 APPENDIX. 

ness indicated thai llie artillery was west of t^udley church) 
firing east across Bull Run. Q. Do you know whose battery 
that was that was put in position? A. Pelham's battery; 
he commanded the tStuart horse artillery. (^ What then 
transpired? A. Major Patrick was ordered to charge, and 
did charge the enemy in that direc^tion and lost his life there. . 
Q. Then what was the next event that transpired? A. We 
moved ofi' across the country to' find out what had become 
of Longstreet's corps ; we moved off in this way, toward 
Thoroughfare Gap. Q. Did you find General Longstreet's 
columns or corps advancing? A. We did, between Hay- 
market and Gainesville. Q. What did General Stuart then 
do ? A. General Stuart then threw his command on Long- 
street's right, and moved down with his right flank in the 
direction of Bristow and ^lanassas Junction. . . We 

took the road leading directly down the Manassas Gap rail- 
road ; there is a road running parallel with it. . . . Gen- 
eral Stuart threw his command on the right of Longstreel, 
and passed down the j\Iana.ssas Gap railroad to about that 
point (west of Hampton Cole's, point marked W). 
We discovered a column in our front, discovered a force in 
our front coming from the direction of INIanassas Junction to 
Bristow. ... It was a good point for observation ; 
u high position, elevated ground. We could .see Thorough- 
fare Gap and Gainesville, and all the surrounding country. 
. . Q. What did General Stuart then do ? ^1. He 
put a battery in position on that hill. . . My instruc- 
tions were to put a battery in position there, and open on 
the column advancing in this direction. His instructions 
to me w-ere to go to General Jackson and report the fact of 
this column moving in that direction. . . I went across 
here (parallel to Pageland Lane). General Jackson's corps 
vfas here ; that is, his command was along the Independent 



APPENDIX. 103 

Manassas Gap liailruad*, and the batteries were posted right 
on a range of liills in the rear of tliat. I found General 
Jackson on a range of hills just in rear of his battery. . 
I then started to return to General Stuart. . I tried 

to take a little short ctit going back to him. I made a little 
detour. I passed where there had been a skirmish the 
evening before 

Q. Did you find any dead and wounded there? A. I did. 
Q. North of the pike or south of the pike? A. On the 
north side. Q Did you find General Stuart at once? A. It 
was some time before I found him; a half or three-quarters 
of an hour. Did you halt on the way going back? A. I 
passed a little time with General Jackson after I reported to 
him, because the batteries were engaged ; his batteries were 
on Stony Ridge. His line of battle was along the Indepen- 
dent line of the Manassas Gap Railroad ; there was a battery 
that came out about the point of that woods (just north- 
west of the Matthew's hou.se and west of the Sudley pike); 
just about that point tliere was a battery from the Union 
side that came out there and took position, and I stayed there 
some time watching the artillery duel between the guns sta- 
tioned here and that battery. Then going back to General 
Stuart I took a little short cut and passed over some ground 
where there had been a fight the evening before, and there 
were some dead on the field. In going back I met a cousin 
of mine who commanded a battalion connected with Ewell's 
corps, which was engaged in this fight; he was reconnoiter- 
ing; I went along with him and saw what was in my front. 
I suppose it was half or three-quarters of an hour before I 
got back to General Stuart. ... Q. When you got 



*. This is the unfinished railroad, not the Manassas Gap Railroud. 
into which its line ran. 



I04 APPENDIX. 

back to General Stuart, where was he? A. Where I left 
him, on that hill. Q. At that time where was General Long- 
street's command ? A. Tliey had come down and were form, 
ing liere. (Witness indicates a point back, west of Pageland 

Lane) Q- Wliat became of this column of 

troops that you saw advancing? A. I don't know what be- 
came of them. Tliey disappeared from our front. Q. Do 
you know of any other position being taken up by General 
Longstreet's command, during the day, in advance of the 
position that you have indicated; if so, when and where? 
y(»u indicated a position back of Pageland Lane. A. I do 
not. Q. How long were you down in the neighborhood of 
this hill which you have marked with a cro.ss, during that 
day? up to what time? A. We were down tiiere the greater 
part of the day ; we were on the extreme right all the time 
afterwards. The cavalry remained on the extreme right until 
the morning of the 30th. Q. Do you know of any other 
measures taken to retard the advance of this column of 
troops from the direction of Manassas Junction or Bristow, 
that day by General Stuart, other than the i)lantiug of that 
battery in that position? A. I do not. Before that battery 
was put in position, Robertson's brigade of cavalry and 
Rosser were engaging the enemy in our front. When that 
battery was put in position and opened on the enemy, it 
checked them and they retired. Then General Stuart told 
me to go to General Jack.son and report the fact that this 
column was advancing in this direction. Q. During that 
day what sort of an action was going on on the 29th, to your 
knowledge? A. There was very heavy fighting going on up 
licrc in Jackson's front. ... Q. What time do you 

think you met Genera! Longstreet between Haymarket and 
Gainesville? A. It was about eleven o'clock. Q. AVas Gen- 
eral Lon'jrstrcct at tlu- lirad of his cuhiinn ? .1. lie was near 



APPENDIX. 105 

the head of tlic fulunm. .... Q. How long a con- 
versation did General Stuart have with General Lee or Gen- 
eral Longstreet ? A. Ten or fifteen minutes 

Q. How long was it before you arrived at the front marked 
W, by you on this map. A. It could not have been over 
three-quarters of an hour or an hour. ... Q. Were 

those troops (Porter's) near any house that you could see? 
A. They were near the Carraco house. Q. Very near? A. 
Perhaps a little beyond. Q Did not you see any troops in 
the direction of the place marked '' Lewis-Lenchman house," 
on that day? A. Yes, there were troops there, too.* Q. 
How were they disposed? Are you certain that no shots 
were fired from that direction at the men about in the 
neighborhood of the Lewis-Leachman house ? A. No, I am 
not certain, though I believe that there were. Q. Are you 
not certain that most of the shots were fired in tliat direc- 
tion ? A. I am unable to answer that for this reason : at the 
time that battery was put in tlunr, tiring in this direction 
upon the Manassas Gap Railroad, General Stuart requested 
that I should go here, and report the fact to General Jackson, 
which I did ; 1 went off then and was gone at least three- 
quarters of an hour or an hour. . . . Q. What 
time do you put it that you came back from General Jack- 
son after being sent over by General Stuart? A. Half-past 
two or three o'clock. 

Rev. John Landstreet, (Chaplain Confederate Army,) 
Vol. S,pp. 91)6-1 008. 
Q. Where were you on the morning of August 29th, 
1862? A. I was between Sudley Springs and Aldie, about 
midway in the mountain. Q. Did you join General Stuart 
that dav. A. I joined him for the first time for eight 



This was tlie position from wliicli Iteyiiolils advanccrt. 



I06 APPENDIX. 

months, alter our Catlott (Station raid. 1 think 1 reached 
Sudley between eiglit and nine in the morning. Q. Was 
General Stuart tliere? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you recollect 
any circumstance transpiring after you arrived there? A. 
No, sir. Just before wc arrived there was a little confusion 
or kind of stampede among the baggage train. I don't know 
that I noticed any of our cavalry there unless it was those 
connected with the connnissary's and quarter-master's de- 
partment. But there was a little skirmi.sh there about that 
time which attracted my attention. ... Q. Do you 

know at what time you left Sudley? A. No, sir: I recollect 
that the next place where I was, was called Cole's. It was 
an elevated position, rather in the angle between Gainesville 
and Bristow. . Q At what time in the day 

were you at Hampton Cole's? A. I did not have a watch, 
but I think it was somewhere toward ten o'clock in the day. 4 
Q. What did you see there which has impressed itself upon 
your attention ? A. There was considerable dust in this 
direction, indicating a body of troops. . . . General 

Stuart ordered some of the Fifth Cavalry to go and cut brush 
and drag it along the road. . Q. Wlio was the 

Colonel of that regiment? A. T. T^. Rosser — we frequently 
after that conversed about it. . There was some 

firing from this position in the direction of this approaching 
force. . . Q. What became of this column of 

troops upon those shots being fired? A. I did not .see them. 
Q. They disappeared from your sight? A. Yes, sir. (/ 
Where did General Long.street form his command? (In an- 
swer the witness marked upon the official map a position 
west of Pageland Lane). Q. What time of day was that that 
they were all in position? A. When I .say that, I say so 
simply from my recollection and guessing at the time. Mr. 
Maltby (coun.sel for i\>rter') — Then T object if he guesses. 



APPENDIX. 107 

The Witness. — What I guess is this : Every man has a way 
of forming an idea of an hour of tlie day based upon his ex- 
perience. It is my recollection that it was somewhere be- 
tween two and three o'clock. . Q. How late in 
the day do you recollect seeing General Hood's division ? 
A. Between three and. four o'clock. Q. Where was it then ? 
A. Where I have indicated on the map. 
l.EWis B. Caeraco, citizen, Vol. 2, pp. 921-923. 

" Q. Where did you reside on the 29th August, 18G2? A. 
Where I now reside, very near the Manassas Gap Railroad. 
Q. Were you there that day? A. I was. Q. Up to what 
hour in the day did you remain there ? A. I was there until 
very late Friday evening. Q. During the day did you see 
any Confederate forces? If so, when? A. I .saw some cav- 
alry scouts during the day, and in the evening there was a bat- 
tery firing some seventy-five or eighty yards back of my house, 
just west of my house, and an officer came there and told 
me I was in danger, and to take my family and go back of 
the line. Q. Where did you go? A. I went up the road 
abotit a mile, to a farm owned now by Major Nutt. 

Q. Toward Gainesville? Q. Between there and Gaines- 
ville. Q. Did you meet any Confederate force on that trip? 
If so, about where? A. I saw them a little beyond Hamp- 
ton Cole's; a very small number. They were sitting down 
on the side of the railro;id, and their battery that was plant- 
ed at the back of my house, that opened on the Federal 
troops directly after I jiassed it ; and when I got up there 
against them, they got up and took shelter on the embank- 
ment of the railroad. Q. Did you at that time see any 
troops to the south of the railroad '' A. None at all except 
a little picket force that was a little to the south of the rail- 
road just above ther^; a small picket force. Q. Did any 
Confederate force pass to the east of your hou.se during the 



108 APPENDIX. 

day? If so, in what direction did they go? A. I saw none 
pass to the eastward. I saw some shelling from the back of 
what is called the Britt farm,* and a disabled Federal 
wagon at the mouth of a lane, called Comj)ton's Lane. (^. 
About what time in the day was that? A. I could hardly 
say. Twelve or one o'clock. Q. You say in the evening 
you saw a battery west of your house? A. I think it was 
only one cannon, seventy-five or eighty yards from the 
house. Q. What do you mean by the expression "evening"? 
A. I mean something like three or four o'clock ; somewhere 
thereabouts. . . Q. What time was the cannon 
posted there ? A. Possibly, four o'clock. Q. You are pos- 
itive about that? A. I am not positive; but according to 
the best of my judgment it was probably as late as four. 
Q. Was it earlier or later than four ? A. It was not earlier, 
I do not think ; not earlier than three, I am very sure. . . 
. . Q. Were there any soldiers of any description about 
your house, except the battery? A. On Friday there was a 
Federal force in Mr. Lewis's field, to the east of my house. 
Q. Where was Lewis's field. A. Within 300 or 400 yards to 
the east of my house. 

William Thomas Moxroe (Citizen), Vol. 2, p. 924. 

Q. Where were you residing on the 29th of August 
18(i2? A. At home (place on the Monroe Hill designated on 
the map). Q. Is there any considerable elevation near your 
residence? If so, where is it? A. There is, just here. (Wit- 
ness indicates.) Q. What do you call that hill ? A. We 
never had any name for it at all, until since the war, when 
it has got the name of Stuart's Hill ; I don't know how, unless 
it was that there was a battery of Stuart's on that hill dur- 
ing Friday of the fight. Q. In August? A. Yes, the 29tb 



This Tarrn is botweon Cole's and llic tunijiiko. 



APPENDIX. 109 

of August, 1862. Q. From that hill what [joints can be 
seen ? A. Manassas and Centerville. Q. How as to the 
Bull Run range of mountains? A. You can see the mount 
ains very plainly. Q. Do you recollect any thing of the oc- 
currences on the 29th of August, 1862 ? J.. I recollect about 
eleven o'clock General Lougstreet's troops first came in 
then, or about twelve; I reckon that battery was posted on 
that hill; it may have been a little earlier, but not later 
than twelve o'clock. Q. Do you know in what direction 
that battery was fired? A. It fired in the direction of 
Groveton. Q. Did it continue to fire in that direction ? 
A. It fired in that direction some hours, or may be more. 
Q. Do you know where it went to from that point? A. It 
went down by, just into the depot that is now upon the 
railroad, and from there to the hill at the Britt house. . . 
. . Q. Do you know where the Confederate lines were, or 
forces, on that day, aside from that particular battery that 
finally got down to the Britt house ? A. There was infantry 
just in here, running from the Warrenton and Gainesville pike 
(back of Pageland Lane.) There was an army road running 
through there, and there they were posted on this road, 
(witness marks the map). Q. Do you know how far down 
they were posted? A. I don't know. (Witness closes his 
marking at the road just west of Charles Randall's.) The 
skirmish line was drawn down as far as Vessel's. • Q. AVhen 
did you first see theCon federate lines advance beyond Pageland 
Lane during the day— the infiuitry? A. I don't know when 
tliis-part of the line advanced at all (down near the railroad). 
It moved down under the hill out of sight of the house. I 
did not see them. Q. Off in what direction ? A. Off in 
this way, I suppose. (In the direction of Hampton Cole's.) 
Q. Down along the railroad, do you say? A. They moved 
in that direction, down along the railroad. Q. About what 



no APPENDIX. 

time of (lay was it? A. I think it was about the luicklle 
of the afternoon, say three or four o'clock. Q. You were 
describing some portion of the line that you did see ? A. 
This portion of the line marched through by the house — 
that was about three o'clock. (The line just north of the 
house.) Q. That portion of tlie line between your house 
and tlie turnpike, you mean ? A. Yes, sir. Q. Marched to 
the front about four o'clock? A. I think it was General 
Hunton'a brigade. (reneral Hunton was along with the 
brigade, and I thougiit he was commanding. Q. Do you 
know of the advance of any of the other Confederate forces 
that day, during the day? A. I do not. Q. Did you remain 
there during the day, in that vicinity '! A. I was about the 
house and about on the farm during that day. I do not rec- 
ollect leaving the farm at any time. . . Q. Did you see any 
separate body of men after the advance of tlie first line march- 
ed across by your house? A. I did not see any marching to 
the place at all on Friday, except this brigade that 1 took to 
be Gen. Hunton's. Q. Could you see from your house to 
Hampton Cole's? A. Very plainly. Q. Could you see any 
lines of troops that would be l"ormed along what is called 
Meadow ville Lane ?* A. I did not see any troops at all 
formed along Meadowville Lane, but about some time be- 
tween three and four o'clock there were some Confederate 
troops formed right along here in the woods (south of 
Hampton Cole's), I think one regiment. 

Colon KL William \V. Blackford, (Confederate, Stuart's 
staff), VoL 2, 2i- 672. 
Q. Which direction did you take in going to meet 



* This lane runs from Haiiipton Cole's northward to the turnpike, 
and is the position on which Porter claims that Longstreet's line 
Wiis fortnrd 



APPENDIX. • III 

Longstreet tluit nioniing? A. 1 do luit recoiled whether 
we followed the Warrenton turi)pike, or whether we cut 
across fields; I am inclined to think we cut across; 
I think we did not follow tlie turnpike. The enemy 
were in strong force, and 1 think we avoided the turnpike, 
so as to strike across the country. We had a detachment of 
cavalry with us, and when we got in sight of Longstreet's 
dust, we galloped ahead to meet the column. Q. Where 
was that, relative to the position of Gainesville and Hay- 
market? A. It was beyond Gainesville; I do not recollect 
how far. . . Q. How long should you say, from 
your recollection, General Stuart and General Lee halted 
for their conversation ? A. They just waited there till the cav- 
alry could have gotten across ; I should suppose Avithin a quar- 
ter of an hour. . . Q. Where did General Stuart go ? 
A. Then we galloped across to our right. . Q. 

Where were you during the day after you left this place 
near Monroe's ? A. I was all around here (Young's Branch) 
reconnoitering. Q. From the direction of Lewis-Leachman's? 
A. Yes; all around that quarter — Britt's and Hami>ton 
Cole's. Q. Do you know of any movement, during the day, 
of the corps that was on this Manassas and Gainesville road, 
beyond Dawkins Branch ? A. No, sir. Q Was your posi- 
tion such that it would have fallen under your observation 
if there had been such a movement? A. I think we would 
have been sent over there if there had been. 
Q. In going towards General Lee in the morning, why did 
you not take the pike as your line of march ? A. I do not know 
exactly why. This road from Gainesville goes off at a con- 
siderable angle towards Thoroughfare Gap. I suppose Gen- 
eral Stuart struck across here. I do not recollect that he 
told me his object ; but I recollect that we were not on that 
pike. We had met videttes, and we expected to run into 



112 APPENDIX. 

scouting parties all the time. I know there were a good 
many turns in the road, and we were a little nervous at the 
small ibrce that was with us, and a little uneasy that we 
would not be able to make the connection, i^. Were you 
afraid that scouts might be around in that country ? A. Yes ; 
we thought very likely the enemy would get in in force, and 
have cavalry bodies out there. Q,. Did you see at any time 
during the day a body of men in the ravine in the neigh- 
borhood of Cunliffe's, marked Meadowville on the map — 
Union troops? A. I do not understand the question, il. 
Did you see a large force, a brigade or two brigades, in the 
neighborhood of Cunliffe's, in a ravine, at any time during 
the day, or in tiie ravine near tlie word " Meadowville" about 
five o'clock in the afternoon of the 29lh, or four o'clock, or 
three o'clock I A. \ do not recollect seeing them. Q. Do 
you recollect whether the Confederate lines included that or 
not at that time ? A. Longstreet's first line was back of 
that; I think his first line was in these woods (west of Page- 
land Lane). Q. Do you say that from positive knowledge? 
A. No, sir; I do not know exactly; that was his first line 
after he first deployed. Q,. How soon did he advance? A. 
I do not know. 

Colonel E. G. Marshall, Thirteenth New York Volunteers, 
and Captain of Regulars. Vol. 2, pp. 130-132. 

Q,- Where were you on the afternoon of the 29th August 
last? A. I was on the road leading to Gainesville — the road 
from Manassas Junction. Q. On what duty ? A. On duty 
with General Morell's division in General Porter's corps, and 
commanding my regiment. Q. Specify the character of 
duty you were performing that afternoon? A. About one 
o'clock I was detailed by General Porter to go with my regi- 
ment across an open country and ravine to some timber that 



APPENDIX. 113 

was fiifiiig our line of baltle, ami deploy skinuisheris to fiml 
out tlie {Position of the enemy, and any tiling else that I 
could find out coneerning them. (^. State the position and 
force of the enemy in the immediate vicinity of General 
Porter's command, as far as you know it. A. Immediately 
after going there, my skirmishers were fired on hy a body of 
dragoons, and shortly afterward there was a section of artil- 
lery which opened fire upon General Porter's comnuind. 
Soon after that, perhaps about two o'clock, the head of n 
large column came to my front. They deployed their skir- 
mishers and met mine, and about three o'clock drove my 
skirmishers into the edge of the timber. We were all on the 
left of the Maiuissas road going towards Gainesville. Their 
force continued to come down all day; in fact, until oiie 
o'clock at night. It was a very large Ibrce, and they were 
drawn up in line of battle as they came down. I reported at 
different intervals to General Morell, my immediate com- 
mander, the position of the enemy. 15ut at one time I 
deemed it so important that I did not dare to trust orderlies 
or others with messages, and I went myself up to him to 
confer concerning the enemy. This was about dusk. Gen- 
eral Morell told me that he had just received orders from 
General Porter to attack the enemy, to commence the attack 
with four regiments. . . About the same time, be- 
fore I went in to General Morell, I could hear and judge of 
the result of the fighting between the force of the enemy and 
General Pope's army. I could see General Pope's left and 
the enemy's right during the greater part of the day, about 
two miles off, perhaps more, diagonally to our front and to 
the right. The enemy set up their cheering, and appeared 
to be charging and driving us, so that not a man of my com- 
mand but what was certain that General Pope's army was 
being driven from the field. . . .Vfterward, at dark, 

S 



114 APPENDIX. 

I was sent for by General Porter, and questioned very strin- 
gently with reference to the enemy, and my remarks to him 
were the same as I am now making, and as I made to Gen- 
eral Morell (The witness read as follows, being 

No. 34 of the printed statement of the petitioner.) 

"General Morell: The enemy must be in much larger 
force than I can see. From the commands of the officers, I 
should judge a brigade. They are endeavoring to come in on 
our h'ft, and are advancing. Have also heard the noise on left 
as the movement of artillery. Their advance is quite close. 
" E. G. Marshall, Colonel Thirteenth New York." 

Q. Was that written before or after you crawled out? 
A. That was written before, upon the reports received from 

different parts of my skirmish line After this 

dispatch was gotten off, I then went with ]Major Hyland 
of the Thirteenth New York, and was conducted by him to 
a certain open space on the front of my picket line ; from 
this map I suppose it was somewhere in this vicinity (north- 
west of Randall's);* crawling out some distance, so that I 
could look beyond this point of timber (if it is correct on this 
map) north-west, in this direction, perhaps a mile, I discov- 
ered a force, the right of which was resting on a timber that 
jutted on our front. Major Hyland had been there preceding 
me, and stated that the line went only a little distance be- 
yond, and it was unsafe to go further I accepted 

his statement, and concluded it was best to return to head- 
quarters, and report the state of affairs; that the enemy was 
drawn up in line of battle, in full view, and were infantry, 
and the line was a parallel to my position that I was occupy- 



'■•■RandalPs house, on the official map, was a short distance south of 
Cole's. A mile north-west from those points the infantry were first 
seen by him, west of Faf^eland Lane. 



APPENDIX. 115 

iiig that clay.* 1 returneil to my head-quarters, and made 
another more positive report. . . This force I speak of 
on the left was developed perhaps about three o'clock. It 
might have been about three and one half or four that I 
went out there. Between three and four o'clock I sent the 
first dispatch. Tt must have been four o'clock, if not later, 
when I sent my second dispatch. 

General GeoH(tE W. Morell, Commanding Division in 
Porter' >^ Corps. Vol. 1 ;x 141. 
When the head of my division had crossed the railroad at 
Manassas I was halted, and in a short time received orders 
to go to Gainesville. As we countermarched to go there, 
my division was thrown in front, General Sykes having 
already passed on towards Centerville. We had gone up the 
road towards Gainesville, perhaps about three miles, when I 
met a mounted man coming toward us. I stopped him and 
asked him the road to Gainesville, and also the news from 
the front. He said that he had just come from Gainesville, 
and that the enemy's skirmishers were then there to the 
number of about four hundred, and the main body was not 
far behind them. I then moved on up the road, and in a 
short time our own skirmishers reported that they had dis- 
covered the enemy's skirmishers in their front. The column 
was then halted by General Porter, who was with me. After 
a little consultation he directed the batteries to be posted on 
the crest of a ridge that we had just passed, and the men to 
be placed in position. Immediately went about that work. 
After a while I saw General [McDowell and General Porter 
riding together. They passed off to our right into the woods 
towards the railroad. After a time General Porter returned; 
and, I think, alone, and gave me orders to move my com- 



* MarshiiU's line was south of RniidaU's lioiisc 



I 1 6 APPENDIX. 

iiiaiul to the right over the railroiid. 1 started them, and got 
one brigade, and I think one battery over tlie railroad, pass- 
ing through a clearing (a corn field), and had got to tin- 
edge of the woods on the other side of it, when I received 
orders to return to my former position. I led the men back, 
and as the head of the column was in front of Hazlitt's bat- 
tery, which had been put in position, we received a shot 
from the enemy's artillery directly in front of us. I got the 
infantry back of the batteries, under cover of the bushes and 
the cre.st of the ridge, and posted Waterman's battery on the 
opposite side of the Gainesville road, and we remained in 
that position the most of the day A little be- 
fore sunset, just about sunset, I received an order in pencil 
from General Porter to make dispositions to a'ltack the 
enemy. That order spoke of the enemy as retiring. I knew 
that could not be the case from the reports I had received, 
andalso from the soundsof the tiring. I immediately sent back 
word to General Porter that the order must have been given 
under a misapprehension, but at the .same time I began to 
make dispositions to make the attack in case it was to be made. 
Colonel Locke soon after came to me with an order from 
Geneial Porter to make the attack. I told him (and I think 
in my message to General Porter I spoke of the lateness of 
the day) th;it we could not do it before dark. Before I got 
the men in position to make the attack, the order was coun- 
termanded, and I was directed to remain where 1 was dur- 
ing the night. General Porter him.'^elf came up in a very 
few minutes afterwards, and remained with me for some time. 
It was then just in the gray of evening between dusk and 

dark Q. About what hour of the day did you 

first hear musketry firing in force and volume? A. There 
were a few shots excluxnged between our pickets and those 
of the enemy when we first came upon that ground, and a 



APPENDIX. 1 I 7 

few scattering shots during the day. With that exception I 
did not hear any until tlie volley.s I have just spoken ol'.* 
. . . I am satisfied, upon reflection, that the order of the 
29th to attack was not counterniaiuled prior to the receipt 
of the order to pass the night where I was. I construed the 
order to pass the night there as being virtually a counter- 
mand of the order to attack. I was making dispo.sitions to 
pass the night when General Porter joined me. 

Vol. 2, p. 442 : I suppose, from the nature of the woods 
which we examined that morning, that we could not get in 
from that quarter. Q. Do you know of any effort to go 
through that woods? A. Nothing further than the inspec- 
tion made by these two olhcers that morning. f Q. Do you 
know iinf thing about those woods? A. I don't know any 
thing about the.se woods; I have not been there since. The 
wood was thick, but I did not know any thing about the 
country. Q. After tho.se few shots in the morn- 

ing were there any .shots tired by Hazlitt's battery during 
the day? A. No, sir; nothing to fire at tliat we ctould see. 
Q. So in point of fact there was iiotliing going on where v<iu 
were during the day except those few sliots in tlie morning? 
A. That was all. We were then on the defensive, as I sup- 
posed ; not ready to attack, certainly. Q. On page 350, 
dispatch No. 28, please state when you received that dis- 
{)atch on the 29th of August? A. " Push over to the aid of 
Sigel?" I can not designate the hour. Q. What efforts did 
you make to do that? A. I did not make any efforts. I 
must have received almost immediately afterward the order 
that I readjust now, to hold on. 



-These were described as in the direction of tlu test of i'oi)t;''s 
command, "a considerable distfuice on onr riuht," and " jiisl :il tlie 
close of day." 

t McDowell an<t Poller when they roilc off tosjclli.i Im )h,. riKlit. 



I I 8 APPENDIX. 

General S. D. Sturgis, Commanding Division, Vol. 2, pp. 
G88-G89. 
Q. What rank and command did you hold on the 2i»th 
August, 1862? A. I was Brigadier-General of Volunteers. I 
had on that day only one brigade of a division, the principal 
part of which was back at Alexandria. . . . General 
Piatt's brigade. . . . Q. To whom were you ordered to 
report? A. General Porter — ordered by General Porter himself 
to joiiihini; that order I received at Warrenton Junction. 
Q. \Vhere did you find General Porter's column ? A. I 
found it on the road leading from Manassas Junction in the 
direction of Gainesville ; I .should think a mile and a half, 
about, beyond Bethlehem church. Q. What did 

you do? A. I reported to General Porter. 1 rode in ad- 
vance of my brigade. I found troops occupying the road, 
and I got up as near as I could get, and then halted my com- 
mand, and then rode forward to tell General Porter that 
they were there. He said. For the present let them lie there. 
Q. What did you then do individually ? A. Well, I simply 
looked about to see what I could see. I was a stranger to 
the lay of the land and the troops, and all that; so, without 
getting off my hor.se, I rode about Irom place to i)lace watch- 
ing the .skirmishers, and among other things I took a glass 
and looked in the direction of the woods, about a mile be- 
yond, which seemed to be the object of attention — beyond 
the skirmishers. There I saw a glint of light on a gun, and I 
remarked to General Porter that I thought they were prob- 
ably putting a battery in position at that place, for I thought 
I had seen a gun. He thought I was mistaken 

about it, but I was not mistaken, because it opened in a mo- 
ment; at least, a few sliots were fired from that place; four, 
as I recollect. Q. Wliat force of tlie enemy did you see in 
that direction at tliat time? A. 1 didn't see anv of tlie 



APPENDIX. 1 19 

enemy at all. Q. Then what did you do? A. Tl-en, when 
they had fired, as near as I can recollect, about four shots 
from this piece, General Porter beckoned to me ; 1 rode up 
to him and he directed me to take my command to Manassas 
Junction, and take up a defensive position, inasmuch as the 
fire seemed to be receding on our right. Q. What firing do 
you mean ? A. I mean the cannonading that had been go- 
ing on for some time on our right, probably in tlie direction 
of Groveton. . . . Q. What time was it when you 
received that order? .1. I have no .way of fixing the time 
of day. I have carried in my mind the impression tliat it 
was more about the middle of the day^about one o'clock. 



8. GENERAL GARFIELD's OPINION IN 1880. 
In view of all the peculiar circumstances, and of his rela- 
tions to the original judgment of the Court-martial, it can 
not be improper to have on permanent record the evidence 
that Ge'neral Garfield saw nothing in the new matter before 
the Advisory Board to change the conclusions he had delib- 
erately reached in 1863. 

" House of Representatives, | 
Washington, D. C, Febrvary 18, 1880. [ 

My Dear Cox — In our twenty-five years of acquaintance 
and friendship, you have never done a greater service to the 
truth, or given me .so valuable a help, as in your letter of the 
14th iust., which I have just received. I have been so stung 
by the decision of the Schofield Board that it is very hard to 
trust my own mind to speak of it as it appeared to me. I 
have made a strong effort to separate myself from the case, 
and to look at it intellectually as though it related only to 
the pieces on a chess-board, and not to living men, or men 
who had ever lived; and all my be.st efforts have brought me 
out precisely to the conclusions of your letter. 



I20 APPliNDIX. 

Still, I had not yet luiule, in the light ol' the new testi- 
mony, a careful strategic study of the field and map as you 
have done. But how curious it is that what you say now, 
with the new maps before you, is the exact picture of the 
field, and Porter's conduct upon it, which glowed in strong 
colors in my mind, and the mind of the Court-martial, sev- 
enteen years ago. 

With kindest regards, 1 am, as ever, yours, 

J. A. (jrAKFIELD." 



insriDEX. 



Archduke Charles of Austria, 57. 
Army, Lee's, its strength, 61. 
Army, Pope's, its strength, 01. 
Banks, Gen. N. P., 33, 41, 7C, 77. 
Batteries, National : 

Benjamin's, '21, 915. 

Hazlitt's, 83, 116, 117. 

Randol's, 03. 

Waterman's, 110. 
Batteries, Confederate •. 

Pelham's, 91, 102. 

Stribling's, 88. 

Of Jackson's corps. 103. 

Of Longstreet's corps, 87. 

Walton's battalion, 87. 
Baylor, Colonel, 91. 
Benjamin, Capt. Samuel N., 21, 22, 

24, 98; testimony, 90. 
Bethlehem Church, 15, 10, 57, 05, 

93, 94. 
Bhiokford, Col. W, W., 42; testi- 
mony, 110. 
Board, Advisory, its iiieinbers, 4. 
Broad Run, 30. 
Bristow, 8, 9, 33, 30, 40, 41, 75, 87, 90, 

102, 104. 
Britt farm, 108, 109, 111. 
Buck Hill, 33. 
Buford, Gen. John, 20, 81. 
Buford, Gen. N. B., 3, 20. 
Bull Run, 13, 17, 78, 79, 95. 
Burnsid.:, Gen. Ambrose, 10, 1:!, 02, 
71, 73. 



Carraeo, L. B., 43, 51, 105; testi- 
mony, 107. 

Casey, Gen. Silas, .3. 

Catharpin Valley, 18, 36, 37. 

Centerville, 13, 41, 05, 75, 77, 78, 109. 

Cheesebrough, Col.Wm. H.. 23, 85,86. 

Chilton, Colonel R. II., 93. 

Chinn House, 33. 

Clary, Col. Robert E., 77. 

Cole House, Hampton, 20, 20, 27, 32, 
34, 45, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 54, 59, 60, 
69, 102, 100, 107, 109, 110, 111. 

Comptc de Paris, 54. 

Comptoa Lane, 34, 67, 108. 

Court Martial of 1802, its mcmber.s, 
3, 50. 

Cundliffe House, 23, 40. 

Dawkins Branch, 10, 27, 30, ,50, 51, 
52, 53, 59. 

Douglass House, 19, 21, 35, 36, 37, 39. 

Drayton, Gen. Thos. F., 47. 

Early, Gen, Jubal A , official re- 
port, 91. 

Evans, Gen. N. G., 87, 88, 89. 

Ewell, Gen. R. S., 103. 

Five Forks, 67, 09. 

Forno, Col. H., 89, 92. 

Forrest, Gen. N. B., 50. 

Fox, Capt. George B., 22. 

Frankliu, battle of, 50. 

Gainesville, 18, 19, 28, 33, 35, 40, 43, 
51, .52, 59, 73, 77, 85, 80, 92, 100, 



102, 104, 107, 111, 115, 118. 



(121) 



122 



INDEX. 



Garfield, (Ilmi .lames \., lii.s rela- 
tions to the CJi.se, 1, 2; nieiiiher 
of court martial, 3, 5; opinion, 
in 1880, 119. 
Getty, Gen. George W., member of 

advisory board, 1. 
Gibbon, Gen. John, 22, 23, 2C, :J0. 
Gibbon woods, 22, 2o, 27, 37, 'J7. 
Grant, Gen. U. S., 1. 
Grilliu, Gen. Charles, 57, 82, 8;J. 
Groveton, 4, 21, U, 53, 01, 07, 00, 100, 

100. 
Ilairston, Maj. Samuel II., 40; re- 
port, 93. 
Hayes, Gen. Rutherford B., 1. 
Haymarket, 18, 10, 24, 28, 38, 01, 102, 

104, HI. 
Hays, Gen. II. S,, 89, !)1. 
Heintzelman, Gen. Samuel P., 17, 
18, 21, 41, 01, 0.5, 75, 78; report, 
85; testimony, 95. 
Hill, Gen. A. P., H7; official report, 

89, 92. 
Hitchcook, Gen. E. A., 3. 
Hood, Gen. J. B., 10, 20, 12, 4:!, 40, 

50, 87, 88, 93, 107. 
Hooker, Gen. Joseph, 8, 9, 12, 70, 

85, 95. 
Hopewell Gap., 92. 
Hunter, Gen. David, 3. 
Huntoii, Col. Eppa, 43, 88, 89, 110. 
Hyland, Major G., jr., 114. 
Jackson, Gen. Thomas J., 12, 17, 19, 
22, 23, 24, 25, 20, 27, 36, 40, .58, 
.50, 70, 72, 77, 87, 89, 102, 103 ; his 
position, 37, 38, 41, 42. 
Jenkins, (Jen. M., 90. 
Jones, Gen. D. R.. 47, 59, 87, 88, 90. 
Kearney, Gen. Philip, 17, 77, 85, 

95. 
Kemper, Gen. J. L., 17, .50, .50. 87, 

88, 90. 
King, Gen. Rnfu.s, :i, 41, 52, 04, 08, 

80. 
Landstreet, Chaplain J., 20, .33. 42; 

testimony, 105. 
Law, Col. E. M., 46. 



Lawlou, Gen. A. li., 92. 

Lee, Gen. Fitzhugh, 91. 

Lee, Gen. Robert E., 3, 12, 19, 25, 
:^0, 39, 40, 48, 49, 00, 86, 105, 111 ; 
his letter, iS; lii.s position, 46; 
official report, 80. 

Lewis-Leachman House, 37, 49, 105, 
111. 

Locke, Col. F. T., 110. 

Longstreet, Gen. James, met by 
Stuart, 18, 19, 20; time of his 
arrival, 20, 22-29, 48, 104, 106, 
107 ; position on the field, ;>0-39, 
43, 45, 104, 106, 112; on the skir- 
misli line, 50; statements com- 
pared, 48, 50; official report, 88; 
other mention, 58, 59, 60, 69, 75, 
87, 89, 90, 91, 101. 

Manassas Gap Railroad, 30, 37, 67, 
87, 88, 93, 105, 107. 

Manassas Junction, 30, 40, 51, -57, 
65, 67, 79, 70, 75, SO, 90. 102, 104, 
112, 116. 

Marshall, Col. E. G., 16, 44, 45, 67, 
71, 82, 84; testimony, 112. 

Matthews House, 17, 94, 103. 

McDowell, Gen. Irvin, 16, .33, 43, 46, 
58, 64, 65, 60, 67, 68, 09, 71, 73, 
75, 77, 78, 84, 115; the joint 
order, .52, 53, 78. 

McLean, Col. Nathaniel C, 22, 24, 
1 86: testimony, 08. 
i Meade, Gen. George G., 22, 23, 39, 

61, 99. 
1 Meadowville Lane. 110, 112. 

Monroe, W. T., 12, 43; testimony, 
108. 

Monroe Hill, 20, 23, 26, :«, .34, :», :59, 
45, 48, .59, 94, 108. 

Morell, Gen. George W., 15, 16, :{2, 
.33, 34, .51, .57, 63, 65. (i7, 68, 09, 
81-85, 113; testimony, 115 

Page-land Lane, :!0, :is, 12, 45, .50, 
102. 104, 100, 100, 112. 

Patrick, Major, 102. 

Poe, Gen. Orhmdo M., 17, 18, 28, 61; 
testinumy, 04. 



INDEX. 



123 



I'one, Mount, 3:i 

Tope, Capt. Douglass, 15, (12, (i:!. 

I'ope, Gen. John, commanding at 
.second battle Bull Run, 4; 
animus of Porter toward Pope, 
7; order to Porter, Augu.sl 27, 
.S, 76: heiidquarter.s on 28th, 1:5 ; 
position wheu Jackson's move- 
ments began. 39; position on 
August 29, 40; his forces, 01; 
order of 4:30 p. .m.. G2, 79: order 
of 8:50 P. M., 79: other orders to 
Porter, 75-79: headquarters on 
the field, 65; connection with 
Porter's headquarters, 70 ; the 
fighting with Jackson, 89, 92, 
113: other mention, 39, 40, 62, 
65, 06. 

Porter, Gen. Fitz John, judgment 
of court martial. 1, 3; corres- 
pondence with Author, 2; ac- 
tion of advisory board, 4, 7; 
march from \A'arrenton Junc- 
tion, 8-13, 70; correspondence 
with Burnside, 10, 11, 13, 73; 
correspondence with Confeder- 
ates, 28; his position at Daw- 
kins Branch, 31 : time of arriv- 
ing there, .52; his conduct on 
August 29, 50; joint order to 
Porter and McDowell, 52, 65, 78 ; 
Pope's order of 4:30 p. m., 62; 
dispatches to Morell, 82-85; dis- 
patches to McDowell, 04, 80; 
Pope's orders to, 76-79 ; effect of 
Rosser's ruse, 90; Morell's testi- 
mony as to orders, 115; direc- 
tions to Gen. Sturgis, 118. 

Prentiss, Gen. B. M., 3. 

Randall, Charles, house, 45, 109, 114, 
115. 

Kandol, Lieut, .\lanson M., 63. 

Reno, Gen. Jesse L., 61, 75, ., 95. 

Reynolds. Gen. John F., 20, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 17, 54, 59, vjO, 61, 68, 6'. , 
7 , 85, 90, 97. 9S. 99; official re- 
port, sc, ; testimony, V&o. 



Ricketts, (.Jen. James B., 3, 19, 41, 
57, 78, 81, 85. 

Robertson, Gen. Beverley H., is, 47, 
90, 91, 104. 

Rosser, Col. Thomas L., 20, 25, ^(l, 
42, 52, 55, 57, 90, 106; testimony, 
101. 

Ruggles, Col. George D., 76-79. 

Salkehatchie Swamps, 67. 

Schenck, Gen. Robert C, 20, 21, 24, 
26, 27, 34, 44, 47, 59, 60, 61, 97, 99; 
official report, 85; testimony, 97. 

Schofleld, Gen. John M., member 
of advisory board, 4, 10, 56. 

Shenandoah, 73. 

Sherman, Gen. William T., 10. 

Sigel, Cien. Franz. 21, 75, 77. 78, 80, 
85, 95, 96, 100, 117. 

Slough, Gen. J. P., 3. 

Smith, Gen. T. C. H., 11. 

Stanley, (!;en. David S., 5(;. 

Stevens, Gen. Isaac I., 9(i. 

Stony Ridge, 103. 

Stuart, Gen. J. E. B. ; near Sudley 
at Poe's attack, 18, 29, 89, 91, 
101, 100; going to meet Long- 
street, 19, 28, 89, 102, 111; gal- 
lops to Monroe Hill, 20, 90, 102, 
HI ; same hill called Stuart's, 
108; orders dust to be raised, 
25, 90, 101, 106; sends word to 
Jackson, 27, 102; .sends word to 
Lee and Longstreet, 87, 88; his 
position in front of Porter, :13, 
42, 48, 69, 90, 102, 106; time he 
arrived on the field, 49, 91. 102, 
103, 104: liis official report, 89, 
01. 

Stuart Hill, 23, :i4, 48, 0, 94, lOS. 

Sturgis, Gen. Samuel D., 57; testi- 
mony, 118. 

Sudley Church, 17, 29, 89, 90, 96, 
101, 105, 106. 

Sudley Road, 16, 17, 51, 5.5, 57, 04, 
(55, 70, h)3. 

Sykes, (ieii. (ieorge, 50, ."^7, 62. ()3, 
81, 115. 



124 



INDEX. 



'I'tM-ry, (ion. Alfred 11., i.icmber of 

advisory board, 1. 
ThorcughfarL' Cap, IS, is, :!<.i, '.C, 

102, 111. 
Tower, Gen Zealous H., 'iT. 
Trimble, Gen. I. R., Hi. 
Walton, Col. J. B., 87. 
Warren, Gen. G. K., his map, 30, 

3.j, 59; testimony, 32, 34, 62, 63; 

dispatch, 82. 
Warrenton, 37, i'.'.K to, 11, W. 
Wiirrenton Junction, S, 73, 75, 70, 

'Jo. 



Warrenton Turnpike, 65, 7b, 8>>: 01, 
11)0, 101, 111. 

Warrenton and Washington road, 
33, 34, 54, 50, 60. 

Wellington, Duke of, 66. 

Wheeler, W. L. B., testimony, 03. 

White, Major B. S., 26, 27, 29, 42; 
testimony, 101. 

Wilcox, Gen. Cadmus M., 19, 25, 28, 
42, 46, 49, 50, 87, 88; official re- 
port, 92. 

Wilderness, 67. 

Young's Branch, 34, 36, 37. 



H 91. 80 f 



'^_ 



^o 



^ ,^.:^'^:%% 



i7o 






" o 



**> '■' \^' -"'i. '^'^ 



'J^c^^ 



■^. 






■^' ^ ^?^^C^*' ^ 



> 






V* 









-i 



'^^K^' - 
><^\ 









°o 












\ 









A 












. rA^; 



<*. 












°o 






V 






o , o . O 






.Hq. 






> 






A 



<. 



■<y 



o 



4- 



,-^'' 



:^c 









,-1^. 















0' 



.^' 









.5--^. ^yj^^^: ^^^^ 



0.vt. 






■■f * 



< 



Ao, 



h- ^^ 









^^"^^^y ' ^^, ^'^^^M^ 






.-^-^ ► 









^oc^ ;>^V,n> ^^^ ^^^^'/^ A 



^^S^ ■ ! -^-^^ %^ -^r.^' 



o 






I 












1^' 


















-r .■ 







N. MANCHESTER, 
INDIANA 46962 



<;■ 









V^ 









